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ABSTRACT
In today’s digital public sphere, individuals have little choice but
to participate on online platforms, whose design choices shape what
is possible, content policies influence what is permissible, and
personalization algorithms determine what is visible. Ensuring that
online content moderation is aligned with the public interest has
emerged as one of the most pressing challenges for freedom of
expression in the twenty-first century. Taking this challenge as its
focus, this Article examines the promise and pitfalls of a human
rights-based approach to content moderation—with a specific focus
on the choices and challenges that online platforms are likely to
confront in adhering to their corporate responsibility to respect
human rights in this context. The Article examines three dimensions
of a human rights-based approach to platform moderation in
particular: a substantive dimension, encompassing the alignment of
content moderation rules with international human rights law; a
process dimension, encompassing the standards of transparency and
oversight that platforms should implement as part of their human
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rights due diligence processes; and a procedural-remedial
dimension, encompassing the procedural guarantees and
remediation mechanisms that platforms should integrate within
their systems of content moderation. The Article concludes by
reflecting on some of the limits of the human rights-based approach
and cautioning against viewing human rights as a panacea.
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INTRODUCTION

The online platform revolution—like the digital revolution
from which it emerged—has altered the social conditions of
speech. 1 By lowering the cost of generating and sharing
information, whilst expanding and diversifying access to both
content and conversation, online platforms have created
unprecedented possibilities for widespread cultural participation
and interaction. At the same time, platforms have also established
and enabled new methods of control which serve to both limit and
shape what users see and hear on a daily basis.
Until recently, online platforms were inclined to disavow the
extent to which they govern speech.2 Yet, platforms have always
been active moderators of online content, with today’s largest
platforms such as Facebook and YouTube, exerting considerable
influence over public discourse around the world. When
moderating their sites, online platforms generally perform two
functions: 3 first, as content gatekeepers, platforms determine
which categories of content are allowed and prohibited on their

1. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004).
2. See Timothy Garton Ash et al., GLASNOST!: Nine Ways Facebook can Make Itself a
Better Forum for Free Speech and Democracy, REUTERS INST. STUD. J.,
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/201901/Garton_Ash_et_al_Facebook_report_FINAL_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL9K-UZ66].
3. GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION, AND THE
HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA 18 (2018). See also York and Zuckerman,
‘Moderating the Public Sphere’, in JØRGENSEN (ED), HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF PLATFORMS
(2019) 137, at 140 (referring to “the concepts of hard control – a platform’s authority over
what can be published online – and soft control – a platform’s authority over what we are
likely to see, and what is deprioritized in algorithms that govern a user’s views of posts on
the network”) (emphasis in original).
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sites;4 and second, as content organizers, platforms individualize
the experiences of their users, highlighting some content over
others, through algorithmic personalization.5
As the digital public sphere has become increasingly
concentrated in the hands of a small number of online platforms,
concerns have grown that platform moderation is being driven to
a significant extent by corporate imperatives for growth and profit
at the expense of the public interest.6 At the same time, a spate of
high-profile controversies, including Russia’s cyber influence
operation on the 2016 US presidential election and the use of
online platforms by members of the Myanmar military as part of
the government’s campaign of mass violence against the
Rohingya,7 have awakened the public to the potential for platforms
to be used to disrupt elections, spread hate and disinformation,
and inspire deadly atrocities around the globe.8
In this climate, the pertinent challenge has become to identify
a way to re-align the private incentives of platform governance
with the broader public interest. 9 In a report published in April
2018, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, David
Kaye, charted one possible path forward. Kaye’s report set out “a
framework for the moderation of user-generated online content
that puts human rights at the very centre.” 10 According to Kaye,
human rights principles can enable online platforms “to create an
inclusive environment that accommodates the varied needs and
interests of their users while establishing predictable and
4. EMILY B. LAIDLAW, REGULATING SPEECH IN
AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 2 (2015).

CYBERSPACE: GATEKEEPERS, HUMAN RIGHTS

5. Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., Should We Worry About Filter Bubbles?, 5 INTERNET
POL’Y REV., no. 1, 2016, at 2.
6. Rikke Frank Jørgensen, Human Rights and Private Actors in the Online Domain, in
NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 243, 251-53 (2018).
7. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, ROBERT FARIS, & HAL ROBERTS, NETWORK PROPAGANDA:
MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 235-69 (2018);
see also Steve Stecklow, Hatebook: How Facebook is Losing the War on Hate Speech in
Myanmar, REUTERS, (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/specialreport/myanmar-facebook-hate/ [https://perma.cc/B65U-F83Y].
8. Mark Bunting, From Editorial Obligation to Procedural Accountability: Policy
Approaches to Online Content in the Era of Information Intermediaries 3 J. CYBER POL’Y 165,
174 (2018).
9. Id.
10. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, UN Doc A/HRC/38/25, 6 Apr. 2018 [hereinafter Kaye
Content Moderation Report], para 2.
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consistent baseline standards of behaviour.” 11 To this end, Kaye
recommends that platforms “should recognize that the
authoritative global standard for ensuring freedom of expression
on their platforms is human rights law […] [and] re-evaluate their
content standards accordingly.”12
Building on the foundations of David Kaye’s report, the Article
examines the promise and pitfalls of a human rights-based
approach to platform moderation—with a specific focus on the
choices and challenges that online platforms are likely to confront
in adhering to their corporate responsibility to respect human
rights in this context. To this end, this Article proceeds in three
parts. The Article begins by outlining the current practice of
platform moderation, illuminating the mechanics of content
moderation, the different influences that shape moderation
policies and processes, and the concerns that have been raised
about how moderation is conducted by online platforms in practice
(Part II). The Article then turns to examine the promise and pitfalls
of applying a human rights-based approach to help alleviate such
concerns (Part III). The Article examines three dimensions of a
human rights-based approach to platform moderation in
particular: a substantive dimension, encompassing the alignment
of content moderation rules with international human rights law;
a process dimension, encompassing the standards of transparency
and oversight that platforms should implement as part of their
human rights due diligence processes; and a procedural-remedial
dimension, encompassing the procedural guarantees and
remediation mechanisms that platforms should integrate within
their systems of content moderation. The Article concludes by
reflecting on some of the limits of the human rights-based
approach and cautioning against viewing human rights as a
panacea (Part IV).
II. THE PRACTICE OF PLATFORM MODERATION
Over the course of the past decade, the growing
indispensability of accessing and participating in online discourse
has been paired with an increasing concentration of power and
control over the Internet’s content layer in the hands of a small
11. Id. para. 43.
12. Id. para. 70.
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number of private online platforms. 13 In today’s digital public
sphere, individuals have little choice but to participate on these
platforms,14 whose design choices shape what is possible, content
policies influence what is permissible, and personalization
algorithms determine what is visible. 15 By establishing and
enforcing rules of private governance that moderate how ideas and
information are exchanged online, today’s largest platforms have
emerged as “governors of online speech,” 16 “custodians of the
public sphere,”17 and “stewards of public culture.”18
This Part begins by defining the core characteristics of
platforms and explaining the mechanics of content moderation
(Section A). The section then turns to identify the different factors
that influence how platforms moderate online content (Section B),
before revealing some of the concerns that platform moderation
has given rise to in practice (Section C).
A.

Defining Platforms and Content Moderation

The term platform is notoriously vague and ambiguous. To
some extent this is because the term tends to vary depending on
the context in which it is deployed.19 The term’s elusiveness is also
part of its appeal. A wide range of companies have designated
themselves as platforms in an attempt to appear neutral and evade
regulatory scrutiny.20 In an effort to elucidate the meaning of the
term, the Article relies on the definition recently elaborated by
Tarleton Gillespie, who refers to platforms as online sites and
services that “host, organize, and circulate users’ shared content or
social interactions for them,” without having produced the bulk of
13. Paul Nemitz, Constitutional Democracy and Technology in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence, ROYAL SOCIETY PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS 1, 2-4 (2018).
14. BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO CAPTURE YOUR DATA
AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 60-61 (2015).
15. See generally NICOLAS P. SUZOR, LAWLESS: THE SECRET RULES THAT GOVERN OUR
DIGITAL LIVES (2018).
16. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing
Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1603 (2018).
17. Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2041 (2018).
18. Tarleton Gillespie, Platforms Are Not Intermediaries, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 198, 199
(2018).
19. See generally Robert Gorwa, What is Platform Governance?, 22 INFO., COMM. &
SOC’Y 854 (2019).
20. See generally Robyn Caplan, Content or Context Moderation: Artisanal, CommunityReliant, and Industrial Approaches, DATA & SOC’Y 8 (Nov. 14, 2018).
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that content themselves, built on an infrastructure for processing
data for a range of different purposes including the generation of
profit, and which “moderate the content and activity of users.”21
Within the broad parameters of this definition, platforms vary
significantly in terms of their functions (e.g., social network sites
like Facebook, microblogging providers like Twitter, and videosharing sites like YouTube), business models (e.g., different types
of advertising and subscription-based monetization methods), and
size (e.g., in terms of the number and geographical spread of their
users and employees). 22 Moreover, platforms are not static,
evolving over time to develop new uses, sources of revenue, and
communities of users.23
Yet, despite their diversity, it is the final element of the
definition—content
moderation—which
constitutes
the
indispensable and definitional part of what platforms do. 24 In
practice, online platforms emerged to simplify the process of
navigating the abundance of information available in the digital
public sphere. As Gillespie explains, “[t]hough part of the web, […]
platforms promise to rise above it, by offering a better experience
of all this information and sociality: curated, organized, archived,
and moderated.”25 It is for this reason that “moderation is, in many
ways, the commodity that platforms offer.”26 Without moderation,
platforms would be unable to shape user participation into the
“right” kind of online experience. 27 “Right,” Gillespie observes,
“may mean ethical, legal, and healthy, but it also means whatever
will promote engagement, increase ad revenue, and facilitate data
collection.”28

21. GILLESPIE, supra note 3, at 18-21.
22. Caplan, supra note 20, at 8-13; see also OECD, An Introduction to Online Platforms
and their Role in the Digital Transformation (OECD, 2019).
23. Sasha Desmaris et al., Creating a French Framework to Make Social Media
Platforms More Accountable: Acting in France with a European Vision 8 (Mission Report
submitted to the French Secretary of State for Digital Affairs, May 2019),
https://www.numerique.gouv.fr/uploads/Regulation-of-social-networks_Missionreport_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9TA-L77A] [hereinafter French Interim Report].
24. GILLESPIE, supra note 3, at 21.
25. Id. at 13.
26. Id. (emphasis in original).
27. Gillespie, supra note 18, at 202.
28. Id.
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In practice, platform moderation is operationalized through
rules of private governance. 29 Some of these rules are implicit,
expressed in the code and algorithms that influence the types of
social interactions that are possible on a platform, as well as how
content is organized, promoted and presented to users—processes
that amount to forms of “architectural regulation.”30
Other rules are explicit, such as those documented in publicfacing platform community standards and terms of service, as well
as non-public internal moderation guidelines. 31 Through these
documents, which are subject to continual update and revision,
platforms establish restrictions on a range of categories of
content—most commonly hate speech, graphic or violent content,
sexual content, harassment, copyright, and illegal activity—the
interpretation and enforcement of which contribute to a body of
“platform law.”32
Importantly, the explicit rules of platform governance are
enforced through recourse to a range of moderation techniques.33
For certain types of content, moderation occurs prior to
publication (ex ante moderation). A picture-recognition
technology called PhotoDNA, for example, relies upon digital
fingerprints (hashes) to automatically detect and prevent the
upload of known images of child exploitation.34 Similarly, Content
ID, a technology developed by YouTube, scans uploaded content
against a database of content provided by copyright owners, who
can decide to block, monetize or track content containing their
work.35

29. Bunting, supra note 8, at 172.
30. GILLESPIE, supra note 3, at 179 & chapt. 7.
31. See generally GILLESPIE, supra note 3, chapt. 3; see also Klonick, supra note 16, at
1630-35.
32. Kaye Content Moderation Report, supra note 10, para. 1. See generally ARTICLE 19,
Side-stepping rights: Regulating speech by contract (2018); Molly K. Land, The Problem of
Platform Law: Pluralistic Legal Ordering on Social Media (2019).
33. See generally Klonick, supra note 16, at 1635. See also GILLESPIE, supra note 3,
chapt. 4-5.
34. Microsoft, PhotoDNA,
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/photodna [https://perma.cc/T8M2-DLWX] (last
visited June 25, 2019).
35.Google,
How
Content
ID
Works,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en [https://perma.cc/2EUFSGPH] (last visited June 25, 2019).
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Moderation also occurs after content has already been
published (ex post moderation). Relying on a combination of
community and automated flagging to detect potentially
impermissible content, ex post review may be conducted
automatically by software and/or manually by human moderators.
Facebook, for example, recently confirmed that the platform uses
machine learning to assess content that may signal support for the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) or al-Qaeda, producing a
score indicating how likely it is that a post violates the platform’s
counterterrorism policies. 36 Facebook automatically removes
posts where the tool’s confidence level indicates that its decision
will be more accurate than human reviewers. For all other posts,
the score system enables Facebook’s team of human moderators to
prioritize reviewing content that receives the highest scores.
In practice, the precise combination of techniques relied upon
as well as the organizational structure of content moderation tend
to vary depending on a range of factors including the function, size,
resources and policies of the platform. Robyn Caplan, for example,
distinguishes three major approaches to platform moderation: 37
artisanal approaches, involving smaller-scale case-by-case review
of content by teams of between 5 and 200 human moderators (e.g.,
Medium); community-reliant approaches, which typically combine
overarching policy decisions by a small team of company
employees with a larger group of volunteer human reviewers (e.g.,
Reddit); and industrial approaches, which typically rely upon
large-scale bureaucracies of tens of thousands of human reviewers
to enforce community standards that are defined by separate
policy teams (e.g., Facebook).
Importantly, the techniques and organizational structures of
content moderation are not neutral but affect how content is
reviewed and which values are prioritized in the process. For
example, whereas the hands-on approach of artisanal platforms
generally enables greater sensitivity to context, the bureaucratized
approach of industrial platforms tends to place greater emphasis

36. Monika Bickert & Brian Fishman, Hard Questions: What Are We Doing to Stay
Ahead
of
Terrorists?,
FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM,
(Nov.
8,
2018)
https://about.fb.com/news/2017/06/how-we-counter-terrorism/
[https://perma.cc/NJ4T-B62P].
37. Caplan, supra note 20, at 15-25.
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on the value of consistency. 38 As the next section reveals, these
organizational dynamics constitute just one of a broader range of
factors that influence how platform moderation is conducted in
practice.
B.

Influences Over Platform Moderation

Platform moderation is not a static process but an ongoing
negotiation between a plurality of actors, 39 not only the various
policy teams and moderators employed or contracted by the
platforms themselves, but also user communities, governments,
advertisers, mass media organizations, civil society groups, and
academic experts. In other words, platforms do not moderate
content in a vacuum but are subject to a range of pressures that
feed into and shape the substance, processes and procedures of
their content moderation policies. In practice, content moderation
is driven by at least four sets of influences—corporate philosophy,
regulatory compliance, profit maximization, and public outcry—
each of which affects what is possible, permissible, and visible on
online platforms.
1. Corporate Philosophy
Platform moderation is at least partially shaped by corporate
philosophy.40 Different platforms aim to provide unique products
and services for their users. At the most general level, platforms
tailor their architectures to ensure they are suitable for providing
particular types of experiences—whether photo and video sharing
on Instagram or microblogging on Twitter. At a more granular
level, platforms operate more or less permissive speech policies
depending on the particular environments they wish to nurture on
their sites. These environments are typically grounded in
particular corporate values which exert influence over how
platforms moderate content on their sites in practice. Facebook,
for example, places significant emphasis on “authenticity,” a value
38. Id.
39. On the characterization of online speech governance as “pluralist,” see generally
Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and
New School Speech Regulation, 51 UC DAVIS L. REV., 1149, 1186-93 (2018); Hamilton,
Governing the Global Public Square (manuscript on file with author).
40. See also Klonick, supra note 16, at 1625-27.
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that informs a number of areas of its content moderation practices
including its requirement that people that connect on the platform
must use “the name that they go by in everyday life.”41
Importantly, corporate philosophies tend not to be static but
evolve over time. Twitter, for example, initially established a
largely hands-off moderation policy, only intervening to moderate
content in certain exceptional circumstances. Originally branding
itself as “the free speech wing of the free speech party,”42 Twitter’s
maximalist approach to freedom of expression ended up creating
a toxic hunting ground for minority groups, who found themselves
targeted by racists, misogynists and trolls simply for participating
on the platform. As one commentator put it, “On Twitter abuse is
not just a bug, but—to use the Silicon Valley term of art—a
fundamental feature.”43
Over time, however, Twitter has gradually instituted slightly
more restrictive moderation policies on the premise that “freedom
of expression means little as our underlying philosophy if we
continue to allow voices to be silenced because they are afraid to
speak up.” 44 In practice, a platform’s corporate philosophy is
important, not only as a means to develop the platform’s user base
but also to satisfy the platform’s founders and employees, who will
typically want to ensure that the company’s underlying mission
and values are aligned with their own.45

41. Community Standards: 17. Misrepresentation, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/misrepresentation
[https://perma.cc/M8E5-FVG9].
42. Josh Halliday, Twitter’s Tony Wang: ‘We Are the Free Speech Wing of the Free
Speech
Party’,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
22,
2012),
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/mar/22/twitter-tony-wang-free-speech
[https://perma.cc/T6PB-QGFA].
43. Charlie Warzel, “A Honeypot for Assholes”: Inside Twitter’s 10-Year Failure to
Stop
Harassment,
BUZZFEED
NEWS
(Aug.
11,
2016),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/charliewarzel/a-honeypot-for-assholes-insidetwitters-10-year-failure-to-s [https://perma.cc/WV27-9SLM].
44. Vijaya Gadde, Twitter Executive: Here’s How we’re Trying to Stop Abuse While
Preserving
Free
Speech,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
16,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/04/16/twitter-executiveheres-how-were-trying-to-stop-abuse-while-preserving-free-speech/
[https://perma.cc/9VJS-7DG8].
45. GILLESPIE, supra note 3, at 47.
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2. Regulatory Compliance
Beyond corporate philosophy, content moderation is also
shaped by the need for platforms to comply with various forms of
regulation—whether mandatory regulatory measures or more
informal regulatory pressures.46 In terms of mandatory regulatory
measures, states sometimes use their authority to order particular
courses of action, for example, platform blocking orders restricting
access to particular platforms or content restriction orders
requiring the restriction of specific content. States also rely on a
combination of content restriction laws and intermediary liability
laws to influence the governance of speech on online platforms.
Content restriction laws define categories of content that are illegal
in particular domestic and regional contexts. 47 In the European
Union, for example, illegal content includes incitement to
terrorism, xenophobic and racist speech that publicly incites
hatred and violence, as well as child sexual abuse.48 Intermediary
liability laws establish the conditions under which platforms may
be held liable for illegal content generated by their users.
Importantly, the scope and nature of content restriction and
intermediary liability laws applicable in any given national context
will generally affect how platforms moderate their sites. According
to Daphne Keller, for example, experience with intermediary
liability laws around the world suggests that legislation which
lacks rigorous procedural safeguards, places monitoring
obligations on companies to proactively police their platforms,
defines the mental state required for liability in broad terms,
and/or requires platforms to make context-dependent
assessments concerning the legality of complex categories of
content such as terrorist recruitment materials or propaganda, will
generally result in higher rates of lawful content being removed
from platforms through their moderation processes.49

46. For a useful typology of different types of government action concerning the
governance of content on online platforms, see generally Molly K. Land, Against Privatized
Censorship: Proposals for Responsible Delegation, VIRGINIA J. OF INT’L L. (forthcoming).
47. REBECCA MACKINNON ET AL., FOSTERING FREEDOM ONLINE: THE ROLE OF INTERNET
INTERMEDIARIES, 31-36 (2014).
48. European Commission, Tackling Illegal Content Online: Towards an Enhanced
Responsibility of Online Platforms, at 2, COM (2017) 555 final (Sept. 28, 2017).
49. Daphne Keller, Internet Platforms: Observations on Speech, Danger, and Money,
HOOVER INSTITUTION, Oct. 31, 2018, at 18-20.
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In addition to mandatory regulatory measures, various
forms of informal regulatory pressure have also been exerted over
the content moderation practices of platforms. Three forms of
pressure have proven particularly prevalent in practice. First,
special units have been established in certain jurisdictions to flag
potentially illegal content to platforms for their voluntary
evaluation against their terms of service. Europol, for example, has
established an Internet Referral Unit (“IRU”) with a mandate to
refer terrorist and violent extremist content to online service
providers for their voluntary review. Between July 2015 and
December 2017, the IRU made 44,807 decisions for referral of
terrorist content, with a removal success rate of ninety-two
percent.50
Second, regulatory institutions have sometimes reached
informal agreements with online platforms to establish particular
standards in their content moderation practices and meet specific
targets. For example, pursuant to the 2016 Code of Conduct on
Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online agreed between the
European Commission and Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and
YouTube, participating companies committed to collaborate with
“trusted reporters”—particularly civil society groups but in
practice also specialized law enforcement departments who will
notify platforms of the existence of illegal hate speech—review the
majority of valid removal notifications in less than twenty-four
hours, and remove or disable access to such content if found to
violate their terms of service or national laws.51 In other instances,
voluntary agreements have been reached with respect to content
that is lawful but nonetheless deemed harmful or undesirable.52 In
2018, for example, the European Commission unveiled a Code of
Practice on Online Disinformation, which establishes selfregulatory standards for social media platforms and the
advertising industry to fight disinformation worldwide.53
Finally, content moderation practices have also been shaped
by various forms of jawboning through public appeals for
50. EU Internet Referral Unit, Transparency Report 2017, at 5 (Sept 12, 2018).
51. European Commission Press Release IP/16/1936, European Commission and IT
Companies Announce Code of Conduct on Illegal Online Hate Speech, (May 31, 2016).
52. Raso et al., Artificial Intelligence & Human Rights: Opportunities & Risks, BERKMAN
KLEIN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY, Sept. 25, 2018, at 37-38.
53. EU Code of Practice on Disinformation (2018).
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platforms to alter their moderation processes and practices in
particular ways or face the prospect of future regulation. Danielle
Citron, for example, has examined the impact of “the shadow of
threatened regulation” by the EU on the content moderation
policies of online platforms. 54 In particular, the adoption by
Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube of a shared industry
database of hashes for terrorist content appears to have been
timed to diminish the prospect of future regulation that was feared
might follow the European Commission’s critical review of their
compliance with the Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate
Speech Online.55
As this analysis indicates, a range of regulatory tools have
been relied upon to incentivize online platforms to put in place
systems of content moderation that meet particular requirements,
standards, and targets. It is important to recognize, however, that
not all governments have sufficient leverage to secure the
attention and successfully ensure compliance of platforms with
their regulatory demands—typically only those that control access
to the most commercially valuable markets.56
3. Profit Maximization
Since the digital public sphere is predominantly controlled by
private platforms, content moderation is also influenced to a
significant extent by the corporate imperative to maximize profits.
Notably, many of today’s largest online platforms rely on a
business model that involves the sale of human attention. As the
cost of creating and distributing content has radically declined and
the speed at which information can be disseminated has become

54. Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship
Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1045-49 (2018). See also Balkin, supra note 39, at 1177
(referring to the State practice of “jawboning – urging digital infrastructure operators to
do the right thing and block, hinder, or take down content”); Robert Gorwa, The Platform
Governance Triangle: Conceptualizing the Informal Regulation of Online Content, 8 DATA &
SOCIETY (2019).
55. Citron, supra note 54, at 1048. On the concerns raised by opaque and
unaccountable forms of collaboration between online platforms, see generally Douek, The
Rise of Content Cartels, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE (2020).
56. See Andrew Keane Woods, Litigating Data Sovereignty, 128 YALE L. J. 328, 405
(2018); Daphne Keller, Who Do You Sue? State and Platform Hybrid Power Over Online
Speech, Aegis Series Paper No. 1902, at 7 (2019); Hamilton, supra note 39.
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supercharged, 57 informational scarcity within the mass media
public sphere has been superseded by what Tim Wu terms
“attentional scarcity” within the digital public sphere. 58 Drawing
on their enormous social networks, major social media platforms
such as Facebook and YouTube generate revenue and profits by
monetizing the attention of their users.59
Through a phenomenon that Shoshana Zuboff calls
“surveillance capitalism,”60 many online platforms enable people
to connect and communicate with each other around the world in
exchange for surveilling their online expressions and behavior.61
In this context, surveillance is driven by a financial imperative:
platforms collect large swathes of data in order to monetize it by
selling targeted advertising.62 Using big data analytics, platforms
develop highly specific and detailed digital dossiers about their
users so that advertising can be narrowly tailored according to
their demographics and inferred interests. 63 Data collection also
enables platforms to curate and present content to their users in
ways that aim to improve engagement with their sites.64 Increasing
user engagement is financially lucrative for online platforms: as
users spend more time and attention on their sites, platforms can
collect ever more behavioral data, improve their targeted
advertising and engagement capabilities, and grow their
advertising revenue.65
57. See Claire Wardle & Hossein Derakhshan, Information Disorder: Toward an
Interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policymaking, at 11-12 (2017).
58 . Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, in Emerging Threats (2017)
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete
[https://perma.cc/522Q-9T9D].
59. Id.
60. See generally Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the
Prospects of an Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75 (2015)
61. Jack Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain, Aegis Series Paper No. 1814 at 3
(2018)
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/balkin_webreadypdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2EML-NUPR].
62. Nathalie Marechal, Targeted Advertising Is Ruining the Internet and Breaking the
World,
VICE:
MOTHERBOARD,
(Nov.
16,
2018),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/xwjden/targeted-advertising-is-ruining-theinternet-and-breaking-the-world [https://perma.cc/3X8X-59L9].
63. DIPAYAN GHOSH & BEN SCOTT, #DIGITALDECEIT: THE TECHNOLOGIES BEHIND PRECISION
PROPAGANDA ON THE INTERNET, 5-12 (2018).
64. JAMIE BARTLETT, THE PEOPLE VS TECH: HOW THE INTERNET IS KILLING DEMOCRACY (AND
HOW WE CAN SAVE IT), 25-26 (2018).
65. Balkin, supra note 61, at 3.
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In terms of content moderation, surveillance capitalism
incentivizes online platforms to moderate content in ways that aim
to maximize both user engagement and advertising revenue on
their platforms. In this vein, changes to content moderation
policies have sometimes been driven by the demands of the
advertising industry. In 2013, for example, Facebook updated its
policy on sexually violent content after fifteen advertisers pulled
their advertising in response to images that glorified rape and
domestic violence appearing on the platform. 66 In addition,
content moderation has also been guided by the goal of increasing
the engagement of users. This is particularly evident in the
algorithmic personalization that many online platforms offer in an
effort to keep users glued to their sites—a product of which has
been the promotion of emotionally charged, extreme and
inflammatory content. 67 Although profit is not the sole driver of
content moderation on online platforms, over the years, it has
become readily apparent that content moderation has become tied
to a business model that incentivizes the maximization of user
engagement, data surveillance, and targeted advertising for the
generation of revenue and growth.
4. Public Outcry
Platform moderation can also be influenced by public
outcry. In particular, when collective action by users, civil society
groups, and/or members of the general public concerning
particular moderation policies has been paired with significant
media coverage and/or litigation, platforms have sometimes—
though by no means always—been responsive to the concerns
raised.68 A high-profile example that illustrates both the potential
and limits of public collective action concerns the evolution of
Facebook’s moderation policy regarding breastfeeding photos. In
2008, Facebook became the target of an 80,000-plus protest by
66 . Laura Stampler, Facebook Will Block Photos Celebrating Rape Following Ad
Boycott, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 28, 2013), https://www.businessinsider.com/facebookfbrape-ad-boycott-2013-5 [https://perma.cc/A8KH-68G8].
67. See, e.g., Zeynep Tufekci, YouTube, the Great Radicalizer, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION, (Mar.
10, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/opinion/sunday/youtube-politicsradical.html [https://perma.cc/FU4E-ZRZT]; Ronald Deibert, Three Painful Truths About
Social Media, 30 J. DEMOCRACY 25, 31-34 (2019).
68. Klonick, supra note 16, at 1652-55.
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angered mothers after breastfeeding photos were removed from
its platform. 69 Initially, Facebook merely attempted to clarify
rather than alter its policy. In 2009, the platform explained that it
only intervened when a photo contained a fully exposed breast,
citing concerns about allowing such photos on a site where the
minimum age is 13-years-old.70 In 2012, a second wave of protests
and the leak of Facebook’s internal moderation guidelines
garnered further press coverage around the issue. 71 However,
protesters would ultimately have to wait until 2015 before
Facebook finally yielded to pressure and updated its moderation
rules, explaining that the platform would restrict some images of
female breasts if they included the nipple but would “always allow
photos of women actively engaged in breastfeeding or showing
breasts with post-mastectomy scarring.” 72 The struggle against
Facebook’s moderation policy on breastfeeding photos
demonstrates how collective action can sometimes provoke
changes in the rules of social media platforms. At the same time,
the episode also reveals that significant media coverage and
protests spanning a number of years may be required before a
platform is willing to implement even slight alterations to its
policies.
C.

Concerns Over Platform Moderation

Although subject to a range of external pressures, major
online platforms such as Facebook and YouTube wield enormous
influence over the digital public sphere, acting as a gateway for
information and expression around the world. Initially emerging
as a means to tame the disorder of the open web, today’s largest
online platforms have gradually developed increasingly intricate
systems of moderation that influence what is possible, permissible,
and visible online. In practice, however, platform moderation

69. Mark Sweney, Mums Furious as Facebook Removes Breastfeeding Photos, GUARDIAN
(Dec.
30,
2008),
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2008/dec/30/facebookbreastfeeding-ban [https://perma.cc/2Y2B-9HDA].
70. GILLESPIE, supra note 3, at 160.
71. Id. at 162ff.
72. Vindu Goel, Facebook Clarifies Rules on What It Bans and Why, N.Y. TIMES: BITS,
(Mar. 16, 2015), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/16/facebook-explains-what-itbans-and-why/ [https://perma.cc/4W2W-R4KF].
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policies have given rise to a range of substantive, process, and
procedural-remedial concerns.73
1. Substantive Concerns
In terms of substantive concerns, online platforms have often
found themselves on the receiving end of criticism for adopting
content standards that are deemed either too restrictive or too
permissive. Given the size and diversity of the communities on
today’s leading online platforms, criticism of content permissibility
standards is to some extent inevitable. At the same time, platforms
have often appeared inattentive or indifferent to the trade-offs
involved in the policies they adopt.
Facebook, for example, has been criticized for failing to
carefully consider the implications of the platform’s authentic
name requirement. Ostensibly aimed at protecting users from
online harassment, the policy—which initially required users to
use their legal names on the platform—has proven culturally
biased and hazardous for groups as diverse as drag queens, human
rights activists, victims of crime, and minority groups that rely on
pseudonyms to protect themselves from physical harm and
danger.74 In addition, when combined with Facebook’s community
flagging system, the policy has also facilitated “organised reporting
sprees” against political activists and other vulnerable groups—
effectively enabling forms of abuse that the policy was designed to
deter.75
Beyond the relative restrictiveness of content standards,
concerns have also arisen that the imprecision and ambiguity of
many moderation rules can render them vulnerable to censorship

73. See generally GILLESPIE, supra note 3; ZEYNEP TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE
POWER AND FRAGILITY OF NETWORKED PROTEST 132-64 (2017); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTISOCIAL MEDIA: HOW FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS US AND UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY (2018); MIKE
GODWIN, THE SPLINTERS OF OUR DISCONTENT: HOW TO FIX SOCIAL MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY
WITHOUT BREAKING THEM (2019); DAVID KAYE, SPEECH POLICE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE TO
GOVERN THE INTERNET (2019).
74. Kaye Content Moderation Report, supra note 10, ¶ 30; GILLESPIE, supra note 3, at
62-63; ARTICLE 19, supra note 32, at 30.
75. Dia Kayyali, Facebook’s Name Policy Strikes Again, This Time at Native Americans,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Feb.
13,
2015),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/02/facebooks-name-policy-strikes-again-timenative-americans [https://perma.cc/9SYL-REDJ].
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creep, inconsistent application, and discriminatory enforcement.76
David Kaye, for example, has recently observed that the vagueness
of platform hate speech and harassment policies “has triggered
complaints of inconsistent policy enforcement that penalizes
minorities while reinforcing the status of dominant or powerful
groups.” 77 Inconsistent application of moderation rules may also
be exacerbated by the time and resource constraints placed on
human moderators, as well as their lack of knowledge about the
specific linguistic and cultural contexts in which content is
shared.78
Inadequate sensitivity to local contexts in the formulation,
application and enforcement of moderation rules can leave
platforms open to instrumentalization for the spread of hate
speech and disinformation, with the attendant risk of triggering or
fueling offline discrimination and violence. 79 The Independent
International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, for example,
recently concluded that death threats, incitement to violence and
discrimination, and online harassment against the Rohingya
minority group had become “common features” on social media
platforms in Myanmar, with Facebook, in particular, emerging as
“a useful instrument for those seeking to spread hate in a context
where for most users Facebook is the Internet.”80
76. See Citron, supra note 54, at 1051; Kaye Content Moderation Report, supra note
10, para. 26.
77. Kaye Content Moderation Report, supra note 10, para. 27; Keller, supra note 49,
at 24; ARTICLE 19, supra note 32, at 16.
78. See Kaye Content Moderation Report, supra note 10, at 11.
79. See generally Molly K. Land & Rebecca J. Hamilton, Beyond Takedown: Expanding
the Tool Kit for Responding to Online Hate, in PROPAGANDA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
FROM COGNITION TO CRIMINALITY 143 (2019); AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INVISIBLE
THREATS: MITIGATING THE RISK OF VIOLENCE FROM ONLINE HATE SPEECH AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS
DEFENDERS
IN
GUATEMALA
(2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/human_rights/invisibl
e-threats-guatemala-may-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/99B5-LG9B]; Evelyn Douek, Why
Were Members of Congress Asking Mark Zuckerberg About Myanmar? A Primer., LAWFARE
(Apr. 26, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-were-members-congressasking-mark-zuckerberg-about-myanmar-primer [https://perma.cc/JQP5-BF5F]; Dia
Kayyali, Alex Jones, Myanmar, and Free Expression Online, WITNESS BLOG (Sept. 11, 2018),
https://blog.witness.org/2018/09/alex-jones-myanmar-online-free-expression/
[https://perma.cc/9PJH-YX49].
80. Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Indep. Int’l Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar,
U.N. Doc A/HRC/39/CRP.2, at 339-43 (Sept. 17, 2018); Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Fact-Finding
Mission on Myanmar, U.N. Doc A/HRC/39/64, at 14 (Sept. 12, 2018). For further
discussion of the responsibilities of online platforms in mass atrocity contexts, see
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In recent years, automation and algorithmic technologies
have increasingly been touted as possible solutions to the
challenges of inconsistent application of content moderation
rules.81 At present, however, such tools remain no substitute for
human judgment, particularly where detailed assessments of
context are required.82 As Daphne Keller explains, “no reputable
experts suggest that filters are good enough to be put in charge of
deciding what is illegal in the first place,” their function currently
limited to identifying “duplicates of specific material that a human
previously flagged.” 83 And even then, the risk remains that
algorithmic decision-making may be grounded in datasets that are
based on discriminatory assumptions, generating inbuilt biases
that are difficult to detect and risk marginalizing and
disproportionately targeting minority groups. 84 Importantly,
moderation biases are not without consequence, potentially
triggering feelings of alienation, frustration, and moral outrage
within individuals and communities whose content is erroneously
removed or restricted.85

generally Jenny Domino, Crime as Cognitive Constraint: Facebook’s Role in Myanmar’s
Incitement Landscape and the Promise of International Tort Liability, CASE WESTERN RESERVE
J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2020); Shannon Raj Singh, Move Fast and Break Societies: the
Weaponisation of Social Media and Options for Accountability Under International Criminal
Law, 8 CAMBRIDGE INT’L L. J. 331. (2019).
81. See, e.g., Tackling Illegal Content Online, supra note 48, at 12-13, 19 (encouraging
the use of automatic detection and filtering technologies).
82. Keller, supra note 49, at 5-8. On the concerns raised by the use of automation in
content moderation, see generally Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Automatic in Moderation,
CORNELL INT’L L. J. (forthcoming 2020); Robert Gorwa, Reuben Binns, & Christian
Katzenbach, Algorithmic Content Moderation: Technical and Political Challenges in the
Automation of Platform Governance, 7 BIG DATA & SOCIETY (2020); Emma Llansó, Joris van
Hoboken, Paddy Leerssen & Jaron Harambam, Artificial Intelligence, Content Moderation,
and Freedom of Expression, TRANSATLANTIC WORKING GROUP, 26 Feb. 2020.
83. Keller, supra note 49, at 7.
84. See, e.g., David Kaye, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc A/73/348, at 8-9 29 Aug. 2018
[hereinafter Kaye AI Report]; COUNCIL OF EUR., COMM. OF EXPERTS ON INTERNET
INTERMEDIARIES, ALGORITHMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: STUDY ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSIONS OF
AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING TECHNIQUES (IN PARTICULAR ALGORITHMS) AND POSSIBLE
REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS 26-28 (2018), https://edoc.coe.int/en/internet/7589algorithms-and-human-rights-study-on-the-human-rights-dimensions-of-automateddata-processing-techniques-and-possible-regulatory-implications.html
[https://perma.cc/5KHZ-67E9] [hereinafter CoE Report].
85. See generally Citron, supra note 54, at 1058-61; Keller, supra note 49, at 22-24.
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2. Process Concerns
Beyond substantive concerns, a number of process
concerns have also been raised, centered on issues relating to
platform transparency and oversight, as well as the engagement of
platforms with different stakeholders. In terms of platform
transparency and oversight, ever since Google released its first
transparency report in 2010, the number of companies producing
such reports has increased year-on-year.86 To date, however, the
level of detail contained in transparency reports has proven both
variable and inadequate. Ranking Digital Rights’ 2018 Corporate
Accountability Index, for example, found serious deficiencies in the
quality of information disclosed by companies with respect to the
volume and nature of content and accounts removed or restricted
for violating platform terms of service, the processes used by
platforms to identify violations including whether priority
consideration is given to flagging by governments or private
individuals, and the number and nature of government and private
requests to restrict content or accounts received via formal or
official channels.87
Inadequacies in platform transparency reports are illustrative
of what Sarah Roberts has referred to as a “logic of opacity” that
pervades content moderation processes.88 For instance, platforms
have typically been reluctant to reveal details about the human
workforce that undertakes platform moderation, including the
nature of their work, the stressful conditions under which they
review content, and significant shortcomings in the support they
receive.89 The logic of opacity also extends to algorithmic decisionmaking within platform moderation processes. Dia Kayyali, for
example, argues that platforms have generally fallen short of
86.
See
generally
Transparency
Reporting
Index,
ACCESS
NOW,
https://www.accessnow.org/transparency-reporting-index/ [https://perma.cc/XR5CJR6Z] (last visited Feb. 13, 2020).
87. RANKING DIG. RIGHTS, 2018 CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY INDEX 51-60 (2018),
https://rankingdigitalrights.org/index2018/assets/static/download/RDRindex2018rep
ort.pdf [https://perma.cc/29QM-BRES].
88. Sarah T. Roberts, Digital Detritus: ‘Error’ and the Logic of Opacity in Social Media
Content
Moderation,
FIRST
MONDAY
(Mar.
5,
2018),
https://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/8283/6649
[https://perma.cc/WX46-A6EL].
89. See generally SARAH T. ROBERTS, BEHIND THE SCREEN: CONTENT MODERATION IN THE
SHADOWS OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2019).
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providing “the most basic assurances of algorithmic accountability
or transparency, such as accuracy, explainability, fairness, and
auditability.”90
Transparency concerns have also been raised with respect to
platform advertising practices. Platforms market their advertising
services as enabling advertisers to reach not only larger but also
more targeted audiences according to a range of demographic and
inferred characteristics. 91 However, controversies surrounding
the 2016 US presidential election and the UK Brexit referendum,
for example, have brought to light the potential for these services
to be repurposed by political actors in an effort to tailor and target
messages at narrow categories of prospective voters in ways that
may be corrosive to democracy.92
In addition to inadequate transparency and oversight,
concerns have also arisen over the processes that social media
companies have established to manage stakeholder engagement.
For example, online platforms have been criticized for adopting a
piecemeal approach to resisting repressive regulatory
arrangements with States. Of particular concern are informal
forms of cooperation that have been established between
platforms and law enforcement agencies, which encourage
platforms to respond to removal requests within narrow timeframes by evaluating compliance with their terms of service. Such
schemes not only incentivize platforms to sacrifice thoughtful
deliberation in favor of speed but also circumvent the rule of law
by enabling States to avoid seeking the removal of illegal content
through formal legal avenues such as domestic courts. 93 In
addition, where such arrangements are based on inadequately
defined terms such as “hate speech,” they may serve as pretexts for

90. Dia Kayyali, European “Terrorist Content” Proposal is Dangerous for Human Rights
Globally, WITNESS BLOG (Dec. 6, 2018), https://blog.witness.org/2018/12/europeanterrorist-content-proposal-dangerous-human-rights-globally/ [https://perma.cc/2SKQT9NC]; see also Lorna McGregor, Daragh Murray & Vivian Ng, International Human Rights
Law as a Framework for Algorithmic Accountability, 68 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 309, 317-20
(2019).
91. For a skeptical view, see BENKLER, FARIS, & ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 276-79.
92. See generally Vaidhyanathan, supra note 73, at 146-74.
93. ARTICLE 19, supra note 32, at 16-17; Lucie Krahulcova, Europol’s Internet Referral
Unit Risks Harming Rights and Feeding Extremism, ACCESS NOW (June 17, 2016, 6:11 AM),
https://www.accessnow.org/europols-internet-referral-unit-risks-harming-rightsisolating-extremists/ [https://perma.cc/9T8R-Y75V].
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governments to request platforms to suppress legitimate debate.94
And by leveraging platforms’ own terms of service—which are
typically drafted to apply globally—as proxies for illegality, States
can also use these types of arrangements to ensure that content is
removed worldwide rather than merely on a country-by-country
basis.95
Beyond concerns over their relationships with States,
platforms have also failed to put in place structured systems for
engaging with their users and other relevant stakeholders. As a
result, the responsiveness of platforms to concerns raised about
their content moderation policies has been somewhat
inconsistent. Twitter, for example, has relied on the subjective
notion of “newsworthiness” to explain why many of US President
Donald Trump’s most controversial tweets have not been removed
from its platform despite seemingly contravening its terms of
service.96 Meanwhile, Facebook only saw fit to re-instate a famous
and historical photo of a nine-year-old Vietnamese girl running
naked following a napalm attack once the editor and CEO of a major
Norwegian newspaper wrote a letter in protest.97 These examples
suggest that platforms may be susceptible to giving preferential
treatment in their content moderation practices to those with
public influence or financial power.98
94. FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM ON THE NET: MANIPULATING SOCIAL MEDIA TO UNDERMINE
DEMOCRACY 12-15 (Nov. 2017), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedomnet-2017 [https://perma.cc/68DF-HM64].
95. Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Terrorist Speech and Global Platform Governance,
BALKINIZATION (Aug. 22, 2018), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/08/terrorist-speechand-global-platform.html [https://perma.cc/R8WU-693U]; see also Citron, supra note 54,
at 1056-57 (describing how the shared industry database of violent terrorist content “has
the potential to blacklist content across the world”); Douek, supra note 55, at 23-31
(outlining how informal and opaque forms of collaboration between platforms may
exacerbate existing concerns with content moderation practices by compounding
accountability deficits, creating a false patina of legitimacy for their decisions, augmenting
the power of the largest platforms, and suggesting a false consensus on where lines should
be drawn regarding online speech governance).
96. Abby Ohlheiser, The 3 Loopholes That Keep Trump’s Tweets on Twitter, WASH.
POST
(July
23,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theintersect/wp/2018/01/03/the-3-loopholes-that-keep-donald-trumps-tweets-ontwitter/ [https://perma.cc/QBU4-KPY4].
97. Klonick, supra note 16, at 1654-55.
98. ARTICLE 19, SELF-REGULATION AND “HATE SPEECH” ON SOCIAL MEDIA 16 (2018),
https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Self-regulation-and%E2%80%98hate-speech%E2%80%99-on-social-media-platforms_March2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S69D-PHTW]; Klonick, supra note 16, at 1654- 55, 1665-66.
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Failures to adequately consult relevant stakeholders over
platform moderation policies can also generate avoidable errors.
In 2017, for example, YouTube’s adoption of a new machinelearning algorithm designed to monitor extremist content resulted
in the platform removing hundreds of thousands of channels and
videos documenting the civil war in Syria, including content that is
of potentially significant value to human rights investigators. 99
While the platform subsequently worked closely with human
rights groups to restore some of this content, its ad hoc restoration
process was itself criticized for favoring groups and individuals in
Europe and the United States with closer ties to the platform.100
Both the erroneous removal of content and biases in the
restoration process could arguably have been avoided or at the
very least mitigated had YouTube consulted more widely with
relevant civil society groups in advance before changing its
moderation processes.
3. Procedural-Remedial Concerns
Finally, platform moderation policies have also proven
procedurally and remedially deficient in a number of respects.
Concerns include inadequate user notification that content has
been removed or flagged, or an account penalized, insufficient
notification of the reasons for such actions, limited appeals
processes, and untimely and insufficient remedies for wrongful
removals. 101 These issues are all the more pressing given that
platform moderation effectively amounts to a new privatized and
digital form of prior restraint over public speech. As Jack Balkin
explains, platform practices of blocking and removal generally
occur “without any judicial determination of whether their speech
is protected or unprotected, without any Bill of Rights protections,
99. Dia Kayyali & Raja Althaibani, Vital Human Rights Evidence in Syria is Disappearing
from YouTube, WITNESS (Aug. 30, 2017), https://blog.witness.org/2017/08/vital-humanrights-evidence-syria-disappearing-youtube/ [https://perma.cc/2D2F-Q64J].
100. Avi Asher-Schapiro, YouTube and Facebook are Removing Evidence of Atrocities,
Jeopardizing Cases Against War Criminals, INTERCEPT (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://theintercept.com/2017/11/02/war-crimes-youtube-facebook-syria-rohingya/
[https://perma.cc/3UE2-JM2J].
101. JAMILA VENTURINI ET AL., TERMS OF SERVICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF
ONLINE PLATFORM CONTRACTS 58 (2016); See generally How to Appeal, ONLINE CENSORSHIP,
https://onlinecensorship.org/resources/how-to-appeal [https://perma.cc/SXQ3-778P]
(last visited Feb. 14, 2020) (for a useful overview of platform appeals processes).
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without any due process rights to a hearing before the action is
taken, or indeed, without any obligation to consider and resolve
end-user objections promptly.”102
III. THE PROMISE AND PITFALLS OF A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED
APPROACH TO PLATFORM MODERATION
As anxieties over platform moderation have risen sharply in
recent years, online platforms have begun to open up about the
substance, processes, and procedures of their content moderation
policies and to acknowledge the importance of taking an expanded
view of their responsibilities.103 Accompanying this shift in tone,
today’s largest platforms have also begun to hint at the influence of
human rights law within their moderation processes. 104
Facebook’s Vice-President of Policy Solutions, for example,
recently confirmed that the platform’s moderation teams already
“look for guidance in documents like Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” (“ICCPR”) in determining
where to draw the line on freedom of expression with respect to
user content. 105 The company also revealed that it “look[s] to
international human rights standards” to determine whether the
content that would otherwise violate the platform’s community
standards should be allowed because it is newsworthy and in the
public interest.106 Beyond Facebook, Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey has

102. Balkin, supra note 17, at 2018.
103. See, e.g., Mark Zuckerberg, A Blueprint for Content Governance and Enforcement,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/notes/markzuckerberg/a-blueprint-for-content-governance-andenforcement/10156443129621634/ [https://perma.cc/YN8R-SQWE].
104. See generally Rikke Frank Jørgensen, Rights Talk: In the Kingdom of Online
Giants, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF PLATFORMS 163 (2019) (on the different narratives
related to online platforms’ commitment to respect human rights).
105 . Richard Allen, Hard Questions: Where Do We Draw the Line on Freedom of
Expression,
FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM
(Aug.
9,
2018),
https://about.fb.com/news/2018/08/hard-questions-free-expression/
[https://perma.cc/RWX2-T99T].
106. Monika Bickert, Updating the Values That Inform Our Community Standards,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Sept. 12, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/updatingthe-values-that-inform-our-community-standards/ [https://perma.cc/P6AA-NHEK]; see
generally E. Douek, Why Facebook’s ‘Values’ Update Matters, LAWFARE (Sept. 16, 2019),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-facebooks-values-update-matters
[https://perma.cc/A6QG-3FZE].
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also acknowledged that his company’s values should be rooted in
human rights law.107
Whether these views signal the beginnings of a more general
turn towards a human rights-based approach to content
moderation remains to be seen. In any case, momentum is clearly
building in support of such an approach.108 Beyond David Kaye’s
landmark report mentioned in the introduction to the Article, a
human rights-based approach to platform moderation has
received the support of a growing number of civil society actors,109
whilst references to human rights have also begun to appear in a
number of statements and regulatory initiatives concerning online
speech governance supported by States.110
Against this background, this section begins by defining the
contours of a human rights-based approach and explaining its
value and limitations in the platform moderation context (Section
A). The section then turns to elaborate some of the choices and
challenges that platforms are likely to confront in operationalizing
a human rights-based approach, focusing in particular on the
substantive (Section B), process-related (Section C), and
procedural-remedial (Section D) dimensions of content
moderation. The aim is to illuminate both the promise and the
pitfalls of a human rights-based approach to platform moderation.

107.
Jack
Dorsey
TWITTER
(August
10,
2018),
accessible
here
[https://perma.cc/A297-PPMA].
108. See generally Dennis Redeker, Lex Gill, & Urs Gasser, Towards Digital
Constitutionalism? Mapping Attempts to Craft an Internet Bill of Rights, 80 INT’L
COMMUNICATION GAZETTE 302 (2018); NICOLAS P. SUZOR, LAWLESS: THE SECRET RULES THAT
GOVERN OUR DIGITAL LIVES (Submitted Version 2019).
109. See, e.g., Jillian C. York & Corynne McSherry, Content Moderation is Broken. Let
Us Count the Ways, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION DEEPLINKS BLOG (Apr. 29, 2019),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/04/content-moderation-broken-let-us-countways [https://perma.cc/YAN5-TBZ5]; ACCESSNOW, Protecting Free Expression in the Era of
Online
Content
Moderation
(May
2019),
https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2019/05/AccessNow-PreliminaryRecommendations-On-Content-Moderation-and-Facebooks-Planned-OversightBoard.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZEH2-T5T7]; ARTICLE 19, supra note 32.
110 . See, e.g., CHRISTCHURCH CALL TO ELIMINATE TERRORIST & VIOLENT EXTREMIST
CONTENT ONLINE, https://www.christchurchcall.com/ [https://perma.cc/UE4Q-X9YT]
(last visited Feb. 14, 202) (“All action on this issue must be consistent with principles of a
free, open and secure internet, without compromising human rights and fundamental
freedoms, including freedom of expression”); and French Interim Report, supra note 23,
at 19 (“the objectives of the regulatory system must be to defend the exercise of all rights
and freedoms on social media platforms”).
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Defining a Human Rights-Based Approach to Platform
Moderation

The starting point for defining a human rights-based
approach to platform moderation is the United Nations’ Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (“UNGP”).111 The UNGP
elaborates a three-pillar framework, generally referred to as
“Protect, Respect and Remedy,” whose purpose is to prevent,
mitigate and redress business-related human rights abuses.112 The
first pillar outlines the State duty to protect against human rights
abuses within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties,
including business enterprises. The second pillar elaborates the
corporate responsibility to ‘respect’ human rights by avoiding
infringing on the human rights of others and addressing adverse
human rights impacts with which they are involved. The third
pillar addresses the responsibilities of States and businesses to
ensure victims have adequate access to remedies.113
Although the UNGP framework encompasses both State
obligations and corporate responsibilities, the focus of the Article
is on the latter. The corporate responsibility to respect constitutes
a non-binding “global standard of expected conduct” applicable to
business enterprises, which exists independently of States’
abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their own human rights
obligations. 114 In particular, businesses are expected to “avoid
causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through
their own activities, and address such impacts when they occur,”
as well as “seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights
impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or
services by their business relationships, even if they have not
contributed to those impacts.” 115 As such, the corporate
responsibility to respect stems from both a social expectation,
sometimes referred to as a company’s “social licence to operate,”116
111. John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General), Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter “UNGP”].
112. Id. at 4.
113. Id.
114. UNGP, annex para. 11.
115. UNGP, annex para. 13.
116. John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General), Protect, Respect
and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, para. 54, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5
(Apr. 7, 2008).
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as well as the existence of a link between a company’s activities and
adverse human rights impacts.
While some human rights may be at greater risk and therefore
require heightened attention in particular industries or contexts,
the responsibility to respect applies to all human rights on the
basis that “business enterprises can have an impact—directly or
indirectly—on virtually the entire spectrum of these rights.”117 The
responsibility to respect also applies to all business enterprises
“regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership
and structure.”118
A frequently aired concern is that the corporate responsibility
to respect may risk over-burdening profit-driven companies and
chilling innovation.119 Under the UNGP framework, however, the
scale and complexity of the means through which businesses meet
their responsibility to respect may vary according to the size,
sector, operational context, ownership and structure, as well as the
severity of an enterprise’s adverse human rights impacts judged
according to their “scale, scope and irremediable character.” 120
Moreover, as Emily Laidlaw has explained, while operationalizing
the corporate responsibility to respect inevitably entails a degree
of market disruption in order to realign business conduct along
human rights-compatible terms, the aim is “to narrowly tailor the
obligations to minimize disruption beyond the intended purpose
of encouraging human rights compliance.”121
1. The Value of a Human Rights-Based Approach to Platform
Moderation
Applied to the specific context of online platform
moderation, the value of a human rights-based approach is
threefold. First, a human rights-based approach provides online
platforms with an organizing framework to transform their
predominantly ad hoc and reactive approaches to the development
of platform moderation policies towards a more principled and
structured approach. 122 To satisfy their responsibility to respect
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

UNGP, annex para. 12.
Id. Principle 14 & Commentary.
LAIDLAW supra note 4, at 242 (critiquing this concern).
UNGP, Principle 14 & Commentary.
LAIDLAW, supra note 4, at 242.
See SUZOR, supra note 108, at 173.
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human rights, online platforms are expected to put in place a range
of policies, processes and procedures appropriate to their size and
circumstances, which should include at a minimum: a high-level
policy commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human
rights; 123 a human rights due diligence process that identifies,
prevents, mitigates and accounts for actual and potential human
rights impacts of their activities;124 verification of whether adverse
human rights impacts are being addressed by tracking the
effectiveness of company responses, whilst communicating
relevant policies and processes externally to affected
stakeholders; 125 and appropriate remediation of any adverse
human rights impacts they cause or to which they contribute.126 In
this way, a human rights-based approach offers a structured
methodology for approaching the development of platform
moderation systems, as well as guidance concerning the types of
measures through which the responsibility to respect can be
operationalized in practice.127
Second, a human rights-based approach also provides
platforms with the tools to assess the actual and potential human
rights impacts of their platform moderation rules, processes, and
procedures holistically, spanning their conception, design, and
testing, their deployment in different contexts, and their ongoing
monitoring and evaluation.128
Finally, a human rights-based approach provides platforms
with a common conceptual language to identify the impact of their
moderation rules, processes and procedures in different contexts
and to explain, discuss, and justify their moderation decisions in an
open and transparent manner.129 To this end, international human
rights law establishes thresholds for when rights have been
interfered with, together with a series of tests to determine when

123. UNGP, Principle 16 & Commentary.
124. Id. Principles 17-19 & Commentary.
125. Id. Principles 20-21 & Commentary.
126. Id. Principles 22, 29 & 31 and Commentary UNGP.
127. See McGregor, Murray, & Ng, supra note 90, at 313 & 329-35; Amnesty
International & Access Now, The Toronto Declaration: Protecting the Right to Equality and
Non-discrimination in Machine Learning Systems, (May 16, 2018) [hereinafter Toronto
Declaration, para. 42-56.
128. See McGregor, Murray, & Ng, supra note 90, at 325, 327-28, 334.
129. SUZOR, supra note 108, at 192.
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rights may be restricted. 130 Importantly, international human
rights law does not always dictate a specific or uniform outcome,
but it provides a framework and vocabulary for platforms to assess
whether the human rights impacts of their moderation systems are
justifiable—with due sensitivity to the objectives and interests of
the communities they nurture and the different contexts in which
they operate.131
2. Limitations and Challenges to a Human Rights-Based Approach
to Platform Moderation
Notwithstanding its value, it is important not to view a human
rights-based approach to platform moderation as a panacea.132 In
particular, the approach is subject to at least three limitations and
challenges. First, a human rights-based approach is not a silver
bullet for alleviating all harms that arise on online platforms. Given
the sheer volume of content moderated by platforms, a degree of
human and algorithmic error is unavoidable.133 Moreover, content
moderation inevitably involves trade-offs between competing
rights and interests. As such, the aim of a human rights-based
approach is not to resolve moderation trade-offs in ways that are
attractive to everyone, but more modestly to reduce adverse
human rights impacts and more openly and transparently manage
the trade-offs between the different rights and interests inevitably
implicated by platform moderation practices.
Second, since the corporate responsibility to respect is nonbinding, there is also the challenge of enforcement. While a human
rights-based approach can be implemented on a purely selfregulatory basis, it is likely that platforms will be resistant where
their commercial interests and profitability are threatened. With
this in mind, a combination of social pressure and smart
governmental (co-)regulation is likely to be required to assist and
incentivize platforms to ensure the human rights compatibility of
130.
131.
132.
133.

McGregor, Murray, & Ng, supra note 90, at 326.
See SUZOR, supra note 108, at 198-201.
See McGregor, Murray, & Ng, supra note 90, at 313.
See M. Masnick, Impossibility Theorem: Content Moderation at Scale is Impossible
to
do
Well,
TECH
DIRT
(Nov.
20,
2019),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20191111/23032743367/masnicks-impossibilitytheorem-content-moderation-scale-is-impossible-to-do-well.shtml
[https://perma.cc/9JKU-WHSQ].

2020]

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

969

their content moderation systems. Yet, given the inherent limits of
social pressure, 134 as well as the risk of heavy-handed
governmental regulation, 135 effective enforcement of a human
rights-based approach is far from guaranteed.136
Arguably the biggest challenge, however, resides in the
translation of general human rights principles into particular rules,
processes and procedures tailored to the platform moderation
context. 137 This task is complicated by the distinct and highly
variable capacities and functions of platforms compared to
States,138 the diversity of products and services offered by today’s
largest online platforms,139 the nascent state of development of the
scope and content of businesses’ human rights responsibilities,140
and the difficulty of defining how platforms should exercise their
pseudo-judicial role of weighing competing rights and interests

134 . A promising proposal that is currently gaining traction is the creation of
voluntary multistakeholder Social Media Councils. See generally ARTICLE 19, The Social
Media Councils: Consultation Paper (June 2019). On informal regulation of online content,
see also Gorwa, supra note 54.
135 . On the features of freedom of expression and online platforms that make
designing a legitimate system of speech governance particularly difficult, see generally
Douek, Verified Accountability: Self-Regulation of Content Moderation as an Answer to the
Special Problems of Speech Regulation, Aegis Series Paper No. 1903 (2019), at 4-8; Damien
Tambini, Rights and Responsibilities of Internet Intermediaries in Europe: The Need for
Policy Coordination, CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE INNOVATION (Oct. 28, 2019),
https://www.cigionline.org/articles/rights-and-responsibilities-internet-intermediarieseurope-need-policy-coordination [https://perma.cc/Y5R2-HVA8].
136. It is, however, possible to envisage smart models of government regulation in
this context. See, e.g., Kaye Content Moderation Report, supra note 10, at 19 (“smart
regulation”); Bunting, supra note 8, at 176 (“procedural accountability”); French Interim
Report, supra note 23, at 17 (“a regulatory policy based on a compliance approach to be
applied and designed with pragmatism and agility”); Douek, supra note 135, at 8 (“a model
of ‘verified accountability’”); and Marsden, Meyer, & Brown, ‘Platform Values and
Democratic Elections: How Can The Law Regulate Digital Disinformation’, Computer Law
& Security Review (forthcoming).
137. See LAIDLAW, supra note 4, at 233.
138. SUZOR, supra note 108, at 247-48 (“There’s no easy answer yet about what
different societies expect from digital media platforms. We wouldn’t want even the largest
platforms to be bound by the same rules that regulate state power”).
139. See, e.g., Ingram, Talking with Former Facebook Security Chief Alex Stamos,
GALLERY
BY
CJR
(Oct.
2019),
https://galley.cjr.org/public/conversations/LsHiyaqX4DpgKDqf9Mj [https://perma.cc/2VFM-NRDR]. (in which Alex Stamos observes
how Facebook “is actually something like a dozen different products strung together”, with
each product possessing “very different safety, security and trust models” and “very
different levels of amplification and therefore potential for abuse”).
140. McGregor, Murray, & Ng, supra note 90, at 313.
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across a wide range of societal contexts.141 The remainder of the
Article takes up this final challenge, exploring some of the choices
and hurdles that online platforms are likely to confront in
attempting to implement their corporate responsibility to respect
in the content moderation context.142
B.

The Substance of Content Moderation

Turning first to the substance of content moderation,
adherence to a human rights-based approach requires online
platforms to align their substantive moderation rules with
international human rights law. The practice of content
moderation potentially implicates a range of human rights,
including rights to equality, non-discrimination, privacy, and fair
process. However, the right that is impacted to a particularly
significant extent in this context—and which forms the focus of
discussion in this section—is the right to freedom of expression.
Pursuant to Article 19(2) of the ICCPR, the right to freedom of
expression is defined in broad terms to include the freedom “to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the
form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” 143
Importantly, any restriction of an individual’s right to freedom of
expression must satisfy the tripartite test of legality, legitimacy,
and necessity set out in Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.
Applying a human rights-based approach in practice, these
provisions should be at the center of platform moderation policies.
As David Kaye has argued, online platforms “should incorporate
directly into their terms of service and ‘community standards’
relevant principles of human rights law that ensure contentrelated actions will be guided by the same standards of legality,
necessity and legitimacy that bind State regulation of
expression.” 144 Yet, while the tests of legality, legitimacy, and
necessity are relatively simple to elaborate in the abstract, their
141. LAIDLAW, supra note 4, at 112 & 243-44.
142. See also Evelyn Mary Aswad, The Future of Freedom of Expression Online, 17
Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 26 (2019); Council of Europe, ‘Recommendation CM/Rec (2018)2 of
the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Role and Responsibilities of Internet
Intermediaries’, 7 Mar. 2018, at Appendix, para. 2.
143. Article 19(2) ICCPR.
144. Kaye Content Moderation Report, supra note 10, para. 45.
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translation from the State to the corporate context of platform
moderation is likely to pose a number of challenges in practice.
1. Legality
Arguably the simplest condition to translate to the platform
moderation context is the requirement that restrictions on the
right to freedom of expression must be “provided by law.” 145 In
General Comment No. 34, the UN Human Rights Committee
(“HRC”) confirmed that restrictions on the right to freedom of
expression should be “formulated with sufficient precision to
enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly”
and “made accessible to the public.” 146 Additionally, “unfettered
discretion” should not be conferred on those charged with
executing restrictions of freedom of expression, while “sufficient
guidance” should be provided to enable such persons to determine
“what sorts of expression are properly restricted and what sorts
are not.”147 Although platforms are not empowered to make formal
laws, there are a range of actions that online platforms could adopt
to align their content moderation rules with these standards.
In terms of accessibility, platforms could clearly alert users to
the existence of their terms of service and community standards
documents both upon registration and during general use of their
platforms. Platforms could also ensure such documents are easy to
find on their sites and available in different languages in line with
their global reach. In addition, platforms could maintain an
accessible public archive of former versions of the moderation
rules and ensure users are notified of any updates to their policies
as well as the reasons for such changes.148
With respect to precision, today’s leading online platforms
already elaborate on the different categories of content that will be
subject to moderation, often developing distinct standards for
general user-generated content and promoted content such as
145. Article 19(3) ICCPR.
146. UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34: Article 19: Freedom of
opinion and expression, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 Sept. 2011 [hereinafter General
Comment No. 34], para. 25.
147. Id.
148. A Rights-Respecting Model of Online Regulation by Platforms, GLOBAL PARTNERS
DIGITAL (May 2018), https://www.gp-digital.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Arights-respecting-model-of-online-content-regulation-by-platforms.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BY2Y-7GJ9].
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advertising. As noted earlier in the Article, however, concerns have
arisen that such policies often lack clarity and specificity.
Responding to these concerns, platforms could improve the level
of detail provided with respect to categories of problematic
content by producing more detailed guidance notes to accompany
their moderation rules, as well as elaborating real or hypothetical
examples and case studies to illustrate how such rules are applied
in practice. 149 Beyond precision concerning the substance of
moderation rules, platforms could also provide clearer
information concerning how content is flagged, the different forms
of stakeholder engagement conducted as part of the process of
formulating particular rules, the range of response measures that
may be implemented when different types of content are found to
be in violation of community standards (for example, filtering,
blocking, removal, deprioritization, demonetization, and/or
suspension or termination of accounts), as well as any review and
grievance procedures that are available to users.
Twitter’s recent update concerning when tweets will be
allowed to remain on the platform despite violating the platform’s
rules because they are deemed to be in “the public interest”
provides a clear example of how a platform can improve the
precision of its moderation policies in practice. 150 The update
includes details concerning who the policy applies to, what criteria
will be used to define the public interest (including, for example,
the immediacy and severity of potential harm from the rule
violation), as well as what action will be taken in response to such
tweets (including, for example, placing a notice on such tweets to
provide additional context and clarity). The update brings
welcome detail to a policy that has traditionally been shrouded in
mystery. At the same time, since the criteria used to define the
public interest will often require difficult judgments, Twitter could
further align its policies with the standards required by the legality
149. Kaye Content Moderation Report, supra note 10, at 15; GLOBAL PARTNERS DIGITAL,
supra note 148, at 16.
150. Twitter Safety, Defining Public Interest on Twitter, TWITTER BLOG (June 27, 2019),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/publicinterest.html
[https://perma.cc/NS9G-FVRF]. For an additional example concerning the alignment of
platform policies on hate speech with the legality standard under international human
rights law, see generally Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, UN Doc A/74/486, Oct. 9, 2019
[hereinafter Kaye Hate Speech Report], para. 4-28 & 46-50.
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test by accompanying these criteria with case studies to further
assist users to understand how the policy is applied in practice.
2. Legitimacy
Article 19(3) of the ICCPR also provides that any restriction of
the right to freedom of expression must pursue one of a limited
number of legitimate aims, namely: respect for the rights or
reputations of others; the protection of national security; the
protection of public order; the protection of public health; or the
protection of public morals. According to the UN HRC, “restrictions
must be applied only for those purposes for which they were
prescribed and must be directly related to the specific need on
which they are predicated.”151
There are also certain exceptional types of expression that
States are required to prohibit under international law.152 Article
20 of the ICCPR, for example, establishes an obligation to prohibit
propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial or
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence—a prohibition which, according to the UN
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, should
be understood to apply to a broader set of protected categories
now covered under international human rights law, including
“race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status, including
indigenous origin or identity, disability, migrant or refugee status,
sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.”153 Beyond
the ICCPR, Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination establishes an obligation to prohibit all
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred and
incitement to racial discrimination, while Article 3(1) of the
151. General Comment No. 34, supra note 146, para. 22.
152. See generally Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, UN Doc A/66/290, 10 Aug. 2011
[hereinafter La Rue Report], para. 20-36.
153. Kaye Hate Speech Report, supra note 150, para. 9. See also Van Ho, Twitter’s
Responsibility to suspend Trump’s, and Rouhani’s, Accounts, Part 1, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 21,
2010), https://opiniojuris.org/2020/01/21/twitters-responsibility-to-suspend-trumpsand-rouhanis-accounts-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/HK5Z-V2TH]; Van Ho, Twitter’s
Responsibility to Suspend Trump’s, and Rouhani’s, Accounts, Part 2, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 21,
2020),
https://www.newsbreak.com/news/0Nu8Hwu2/twitters-responsibility-tosuspend-trumps-and-rouhanis-accounts-part-2 [https://perma.cc/UZ68-VDAN].
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Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography
establishes an obligation to prohibit the production, distribution
and dissemination of child pornography. In addition, Security
Council resolution 1624 (2005) calls upon States to “prohibit by
law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts,” while certain
forms of expression are also prohibited under international
criminal law including, for example, direct and public incitement to
commit genocide.154
Applied to the platform moderation context, two implications
flow from these provisions.155 First, platforms should prohibit the
same exceptional and narrowly-defined forms of expression that
States are required to prohibit under international law.
Importantly, since the prohibition of these categories of content
amount to restrictions on the right to freedom of expression, their
prohibition must comply with the tripartite test of legality,
legitimacy, and necessity set out in Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.156 A
particular challenge in this regard resides in defining these forms
of expression, several of which – such as incitement to commit
terrorism – have been subject to conflicting guidance and
interpretation.157 The importance of this challenge should not be
understated: if platforms define these categories too broadly, they
risk removing content beyond what is necessary in pursuance of a
legitimate aim; by contrast, if platforms define these categories too
narrowly, they risk nurturing dangerous online environments. I
return to this challenge below in the context of examining the test
of necessity.
Second, a platform should only restrict other categories of
content provided such restrictions are in pursuance of at least one
154. See generally GREGORY S. GORDON, ATROCITY SPEECH LAW: FOUNDATION,
FRAGMENTATION, FRUITION (2017).
155. See GLOBAL PARTNERS DIGITAL, supra note 148, at 16-17
156. La Rue Report, supra note 152, para. 37; General Comment No. 34, supra note
146, para. 50-52. See, however, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media,
Propaganda and Freedom of the Media, Non-Paper (2015), at 15-17 (arguing that freedom
of expression under the ICCPR “should be interpreted as not including war propaganda
and hate speech that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”); Van
Ho, Part 2, supra note 153 (“The ICCPR’s Article 20 prohibition stands in contrast to the
ICCPR’s Article 19(3) balancing terms for freedom of expression generally because the
international community has determined that propaganda for war serves no public
interest and cannot be favourably balanced”).
157. La Rue Report, supra note 152, para. 20-36.
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of the legitimate aims elaborated in Article 19(3). The prospect of
applying this test in the platform moderation context has led to
questions concerning the appropriateness of requiring platforms
to justify their online content restrictions solely on the limited
public interest grounds recognized under Article 19(3). 158
Although understandable, such concerns should not be overstated.
It is true that companies are not well-placed to assess threats
to “national security” or “public order”—grounds that should be
relied upon by platforms only on the basis of legal orders from
States, which themselves are subject to the tripartite test set out in
Article 19(3). 159 Nonetheless, many of the most common
categories of content restricted by online platforms correspond
with little difficulty to at least one of the legitimate aims elaborated
in Article 19(3). 160 As David Kaye has observed, human rights
standards “would justify taking action against anti-vaccination
sites that harm public health, white supremacists who incite harm
of others, and terrorist groups like ISIS that use platforms to extend
their violence.”161
In addition, it is suggested that the legitimate aim of “the
rights of others” can afford platforms sufficient leeway to tailor
their moderation policies to the different communities they are
designed to serve.162 In particular, reliance on the legitimate aim of
“the rights of others” would enable a platform to examine whether
restrictions on freedom of expression are necessary to create
positive and supportive spaces that nurture the freedom of
expression of specific categories of users (for example, children or
those with mental health issues),163 to protect the rights of users to
privacy and security,164 or even simply to create particular online
experiences (for example, designing a platform for sharing dog
158. Aswad, supra note 142, at 52-56.
159. Kaye Hate Speech Report, supra note 150, para. 47(b).
160. GLOBAL PARTNERS DIGITAL, supra note 148, at 16-17.
161. David Kaye, The Clash Over Regulating Online Speech, SLATE (June 6, 2019),
https://slate.com/technology/2019/06/social-media-companies-online-speechamerica-europe-world.html [https://perma.cc/KG9F-QDJ3].
162 . See General Comment No. 34, supra note 146, para. 28 (“the term “rights”
includes human rights as recognized in the Covenant and more generally in international
human rights law”).
163. GLOBAL PARTNERS DIGITAL, supra note 148, at 17. See also KATE JONES, ONLINE
DISINFORMATION AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE: APPLYING A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 29, 46
(2019).
164. Kaye, supra note 73, at 120.
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photos to the exclusion of photos related to other pets) as part of
the platform’s entrepreneurial freedom to design, innovate, and
conduct a business—the latter freedom falling within the
platform’s right to property and freedom of expression.165
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the
legitimate aim of “the rights of others” is not unlimited: it would
not justify the establishment of platforms designed to serve
communities whose purpose is to share content prohibited under
international human rights law, such as revenge porn or racist
sites. Moreover, the legitimate aim of “the rights of others” remains
subject to the test of necessity, which, as the next section explains,
generally requires a careful contextually-informed balancing of
different rights and interests. In practice, therefore, the trickiest
challenge for platforms seeking to align their substantive content
moderation rules with human rights standards will not generally
reside in identifying a relevant legitimate aim, but rather in
weighing and balancing competing rights and interests in
accordance with the final requirement under Article 19(3)—the
test of necessity.

165. See, e.g., Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete & Index.hu ZRT v. Hungary,
HUDOC,
at
10
(2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-160314
[https://perma.cc/E6EQ-YFYD] (referring to a company’s right to freedom of expression);
Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion & Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion & Expression on Its Thirty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/38, para. 55
(2016) (“[i]t remains an open question how freedom of expression concerns raised by
design and engineering choices should be reconciled with the freedom of private entities
to design and customize their platforms as they choose.”). See also WOLFGANG BENEDEK &
MATTHIAS KETTEMANN, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE INTERNET 106 (2013) (referring to
“the right to property and the right to keep privately owned social networks private and
subject only to terms of service”); Nicolas Suzor, The Role of the Rule of Law in Virtual
Communities, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1817, 1853-54 (2010) (referring to “the free speech
interests of the providers”); Rikke Frank Jørgensen and Anja Møller Pedersen, Online
Service Providers as Human Rights Arbiters, in THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF ONLINE SERVICE
PROVIDERS 179, 183 (2017) (referring to “the freedom of the intermediary to conduct a
business (provide internet services)”); Jack Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and
Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2080 (2004) (referring to “the
platform owner’s constitutional right to design”); French Interim Report, supra note 23, at
19 (recognizing social networks’ entrepreneurial freedom, including the right to define
and apply terms of use, to exercise an unrestricted information ordering system and to
innovate (especially for smaller operators).
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3. Necessity
Article 19(3) of the ICCPR also provides that restrictions on
the right to freedom of expression must be “necessary” for the
achievement of at least one of the prescribed legitimate aims.166
According to the UN HRC, the concept of necessity requires that
restrictions on freedom of expression “not be overbroad,” but
rather represent “the least intrusive instrument amongst those
which might achieve their protective function.” 167 In addition,
necessity requires “demonstrat[ing] in specific and individualized
fashion the precise nature of the threat, and the necessity and
proportionality of the specific action taken, in particular by
establishing a direct and immediate connection between the
expression and the threat.” 168 In practice, the test of necessity
generally requires a context-sensitive balancing of competing
rights and interests. 169 However, applying the balancing
assessments conducted in existing human rights caselaw to the
platform moderation context is complicated for two reasons.
First, although a variety of sources may assist platforms in
applying the test of necessity—including the concluding
observations, commentaries and jurisprudence of the UN treaty
bodies, the jurisprudence of international, regional and national
courts, as well as reports produced by UN Special Rapporteurs and
civil society groups—the guidance produced by these sources has
not always been clear or consistent. For example, Article 20(2) of
the ICCPR—which, it will be recalled, obliges States to prohibit any
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence—has been
subject to reservations issued by numerous States, divergent
implementation in domestic law and practice, as well as
166. Article 19(3), ICCPR
167. General Comment No. 34, supra note 146, para. 34.
168. Id. para. 35.
169. See, e.g., Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu ZRT v. Hungary,
HUDOC,
para.
58
(2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-160314
[https://perma.cc/JDE9-3G3Y] (observing that the Court may be required to ascertain
whether the domestic authorities have struck “a fair balance” when protecting two values
guaranteed by the Convention which may come into conflict with each other in certain
cases). See also Equality & Hum. Rts. Comm’n, Guidance – Legal Framework: Freedom of
Expression,
at
6
(2015),
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/20150318_foe_legal_framew
ork_guidance_revised_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9359-JKP9].
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inconsistent interpretation within international and regional
jurisprudence. 170 Where such disagreement exists, platforms
should be afforded greater leeway to determine the appropriate
way to apply the relevant standards within their community
standards, giving due consideration to the diversity of guidance
available and the different contexts in which the platform operates,
whilst also taking care so far as feasible to consult with local
stakeholders.171
Second, even where guidance is clear and consistent,
transplanting assessments of necessity from existing human rights
case law to the platform moderation context is also complicated by
the distinct and variable capacities and functions of online
platforms compared to States, as well as the diversity of contexts
in which platforms operate. 172 Moreover, since certain larger
platforms, such as Facebook, offer a number of different services
(for example, enabling users not only to post but also to promote
and amplify their content through advertising) and manage a
diversity of spaces (for example, the news feed, public pages, a
170. See generally Rabat Plan of Action on the Prohibition of Advoc. of Nat’l, Racial or
Religious Hatred that Constitutes Incitement to Discrimination, Hostility or Violence, at
Appendix, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, (2012) [hereinafter Rabat Plan of Action];
ARTICLE 19,
Hate
Speech
Explained:
A
Toolkit,
at
70-75,
(2015),
https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38231/'Hate-Speech'-Explained--A-Toolkit-%282015-Edition%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/27Q6-GHX9]; see generally Amal
Clooney & Philippa Webb, The Right to Insult in International Law, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 1 (2017); Catherine O’Regan, Hate Speech Online: An (Intractable) Contemporary
Challenge?, 71 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 403, 407 (2018).
171. See also LAIDLAW, supra note 4, at 241; Evelyn Aswad, The Role of U.S. Technology
Companies as Enforcers of Europe’s New Internet Hate Speech Ban, COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
ONLINE 1, 13 (2016) http://hrlr.law.columbia.edu/hrlr-online/the-role-of-u-s-technologycompanies-as-enforcers-of-europes-new-internet-hate-speech-ban/
[https://perma.cc/KS3V-YNCB] (arguing that, for the purpose of adhering to the UNGP,
technology companies should adhere to international human rights standards under the
ICCPR rather than regional human rights standards).
172. See also, Nicolas Suzor, supra note 165, at 1865 (“It is not possible to provide
any definitive answers as to which values should be read into virtual community
governance structures… The exact content and boundaries of any such limits will always
be highly contextual”); Patrick Leerssen, Cut Out by The Middle Man: The Free Speech
Implications of Social Network Blocking and Banning In The EU, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH.
& ELECTRONIC COM. L. 99, 112 (2015) (arguing that the balance between a ground for
removing content and the end user’s free speech rights “requires a different calculus than
that which is applied to state interference…”); JONES, supra note 163, at 30 (“Establishing
how existing norms apply in new contexts is likely to be contested, and reaching settled
views takes time whether it is done through expert opinion, through the drafting of
normative guidance, through state negotiation or litigation”).
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variety of groups, and personal profiles), the assessment of
whether a restriction is necessary may vary across the services and
spaces operated within the same platform.173
Notwithstanding the complexity of the task, it is nonetheless
possible to identify a number of general principles within existing
human rights jurisprudence that may assist online platforms in
applying the test of necessity in practice. The following is not
intended to be exhaustive. Rather, the aim is to illustrate the
different types of considerations that platforms should consider in
applying the test of necessary in the platform moderation context.
a. Local Context
First, assessments of necessity require careful consideration
of various dimensions of the local context where the content is
transmitted, including both the timing and location of the
expression. In Kim Jong-Cheol v. Republic of Korea, for example, the
UN HRC confirmed that it might be legitimate for a State to restrict
the publication of political polling for a limited period in advance
of an election in order to maintain the integrity of the electoral
process.174 In reaching this conclusion, the UN HRC expressly took
into account “the recent historical specificities of the democratic
political processes” in the Republic of Korea, including the
vulnerability of its election culture and climate to political
manipulation and irregularities. 175 In a similar vein, David Kaye
has emphasized the importance of contextual considerations for
determining whether an expression constitutes incitement to
hatred, including factors such as “the existence of patterns of
tension between religious or racial communities, discrimination
against the targeted group, the tone and content of the speech, the
person inciting hatred, and the means of disseminating the
expression of hate.”176
Applied to platform moderation, these findings suggest that
platforms should consider whether certain restrictions may only
173. See Ingram, supra note 139.
174 . Kim Jong-Cheol v. Republic of Korea, Hum. Rts. Committee, Comm. No.
968/2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C84/D/968/2001, para. 8.3 (2005).
175. Id.
176. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion & Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion & Expression on Its Sixty-Seventh Session, UN Doc A/67/357, para.
46 (2012). See also Rabat Plan of Action, supra note 170, para. 29.
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be necessary during certain periods of time and how restrictions
should apply in particular contexts, having due regard for social,
historical, cultural and linguistic nuance as far as possible.177 In the
latter regard, it is notable that Samidh Chakrabarti, a director of
product management at Facebook, recently confirmed that a key
challenge for the company is “how not to think of our platforms as
one thing that’s the same across the world, but how should they be
different in different regions to try to mitigate […] risks.” 178 To
meet this challenge, platforms should engage – so far as possible in
light of their of size and circumstances— with local stakeholders
to assist in the development of their content moderation rules, as
well as any accompanying guidelines for their interpretation in the
different contexts in which they operate.179
b. Platform Characteristics
Second, assessments of necessity also require consideration
of the means used to transmit the expression, taking into account
both the purpose of the expression and its intended audience. In
the case of Jersild v. Denmark, for example, the European Court of
Human Rights concluded that Denmark had violated a journalist’s
right to freedom of expression by convicting him for aiding and
abetting the dissemination of racist remarks through the broadcast
of a programme that included an item on young extremists.180 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court had regard not only to the
manner in which the feature had been prepared and its contents
but also the purpose of the program and the setting in which it was
broadcast, including the fact that “the item was broadcast as part
177. See AccessNow, supra note 109, at 7 (“Companies should not apply content
moderation rules in a “one size fits all” fashion… [but] should take social, cultural and
linguistic nuance into account, as much as possible.”); ARTICLE 19, supra note 134, at 13 (“A
degree of variation is inherent to international human rights law . . . fundamental rights
are general principles, they are standards, and when they are translated into actual
detailed rules through (judicial) approaches, there is unavoidably a certain margin of
manoeuvre that comes into play.”).
178. David Ingram, Facebook’s New Rapid Response Team has a Crucial Task: Avoid
Fueling
Another
Genocide,
NBC
NEWS,
(June
20,
2019),
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/facebook-s-new-rapid-response-team-hascrucial-task-avoid-n1019821 [https://perma.cc/9UUU-ESAR]. Cf. Keller, supra note 56, at
8 (discussing “platforms’ operational preference for a single set of rules”).
179. AccessNow, supra note 109, at 7.
180. Jersild v. Denmark, HUDOC, para. 37 (1994),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57891[https://perma.cc/N8PF-59RX].
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of a serious Danish news programme and was intended for a wellinformed audience.”181
Translated to the platform moderation context, these findings
suggest that the test of necessity should be applied with due
sensitivity to the function of a platform and the size and nature of
the community it serves. 182 For example, a human rights-based
approach would afford leeway to platforms to implement more
restrictive moderation rules where necessary to create virtual
spaces specifically designed to nurture and protect particular
communities (for example, restricting content that could trigger
anxiety or panic amongst users of a platform designed for those
with mental health problems) or to establish particular online
experiences (for example, restricting photos of cats on a platform
designed solely for sharing and discussing photos of dogs)
provided doing so does not generate disproportionate adverse
human rights impacts within and/or beyond the platform.183
By contrast, where an online platform functions as a more
general space for the free exchange of ideas—particularly one that
has become a dominant and essential channel for public
communication due to a dearth of viable alternative platforms that
command similar network effects—the application of the necessity
test will generally require a more nuanced approach.184 For these
181. Id. para. 30-37.
182. See Balkin, supra note 165, at 2080 (“Everything depends on the nature of the
virtual space that the platform owner has created”); Suzor, supra note 165, at 1852
(referring to the importance of “a thorough examination of the circumstances and social
structure of the particular community”).
183 . See also GLOBAL PARTNERS DIGITAL, supra note 148, at 17 (“there may be
situations where platforms have been (or may be) developed for a specific purpose, or for
a particular community, which needs restrictions on certain content to ensure that the
platform can meet the legitimate needs of its users”); York & McSherry, supra note 109
(“smaller platforms dedicated to serving specific communities may want to take a more
aggressive approach. That’s fine, as long as Internet users have a range of meaningful
options with which to engage”).
184. The relevance of a platform’s dominance finds support in the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights, which has circumscribed the obligations of States to
respect and ensure the right to freedom of expression in a range of contexts based on
whether applicants whose expression has been restricted by private actors have at their
disposal viable alternative platforms to exercise their expression. See, e.g., Animal
Defenders International v. the UK, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. Ap. No.48876/08 (2013) 21, 41-43
(concluding that the UK’s prohibition of political advertising on television and radio did
not violate Article 10 ECHR, based in part on the fact that “a range of alternative media
were available to the applicant”, including “radio or television discussion programmes of
a political nature”, as well as “non-broadcasting media including the print media, the

982

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:4

virtual spaces, a useful way of approaching the application of the
necessity test is to distinguish between a platform’s gatekeeping
function, through which it determines the permissibility of
content, and its recommendation function, through which it
determines the visibility of content.185
With respect to the gatekeeping function, it is suggested that
the necessity test will generally require larger market-dominant
platforms to adopt a more inclusive and permissive approach to
the moderation of content, pursuant to which the removal of only
a limited range of narrowly defined categories of content is likely
to be deemed necessary in practice. Similar to States, platforms
managing larger more general online spaces are likely to find it
difficult to justify the necessity of removing most forms of hate
speech that are merely offensive, disturbing or shocking, but which
do not rise to the level of threats of violence, harassment or assault
against individually identifiable victims or the advocacy of
discriminatory hatred constituting incitement to hostility,
discrimination or violence.186 At the same time, since larger virtual
spaces also enable users to disseminate their content to wider
audiences, a human rights-based approach also expects these
internet (including social media) as well as [ . . . ] demonstrations, posters and flyers”);
Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, App. Nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015) para.
51-55 (observing that YouTube contained “specific information of interest to the
applicants that is not easily accessible by other means” to reach the conclusion that no
viable alternatives were available to the applicants to exercise their freedom to receive
and impart information and ideas). See also Christina Angelopoulos et al., Study of
Fundamental Rights Limitations for Online Enforcement Through Self-Regulation, Inst. for
Info. L. 50 (2015) (noting that the “degree of dominance” of a company is relevant to a
human rights analysis because, inter alia, the nature of the service can make it more
difficult to abandon the service, for example “when the alternative services are very
limited or are not of practical worth”); Leerssen, supra note 172, at 112 (“An important
factor in determining the intermediary’s discretion should be their degree of dominance
as reflected in the ECHR’s case law”); Keller, supra note 56, at 18 (“Many critics argue [ . . .
] that the platform ecosystem has created new forms of scarcity. Even if users can still
speak on less-popular platforms, they argue, those may be inadequate because not enough
other people are there to listen or respond”).
185. Timothy B. Lee, Alex Jones is a crackpot – but banning him from Facebook might
be a bad idea, ARS TECHNICA (August 6, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2018/08/op-ed-alex-jones-is-a-crackpot-but-banning-him-from-facebook-mightbe-a-bad-idea [https://perma.cc/Q48R-VSYG] (referring to platforms as “two separate
products: a hosting product and a recommendation product”). See also Keller, supra note
56, at 25-26 (referring to the “rank but don’t remove” model of platform moderation,
“requiring major platforms to offer an uncurated, unranked service but preserving their
discretion over the curated version”).
186. See ARTICLE 19, supra note 170, at 18-23.
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larger platforms to exercise particular vigilance and engage in
structured and sustained engagement with local stakeholders to
understand the coded language that may be relied upon in
particular contexts,187 both in identifying prohibited forms of hate
speech constituting incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence and in ensuring its timely removal in order to protect
individuals and communities that may be adversely impacted by
such speech whether online and/or offline—particularly in
environments experiencing heightened tension or conflict.188
With respect to a platform’s recommendation function, by
contrast, it is suggested that the necessity test will generally afford
larger platforms much greater leeway to adopt a more hands-on
approach to moderation, permitting reliance on a diversity of
measures to reduce the visibility of a broader range of categories
of content—for example, by adopting higher standards for content
that is amplified or microtargeted as a paid advertisement or a
sponsored post,189 attaching a warning label to photos and videos
that depict various forms of especially graphic or violent content,
or down-ranking content that has been identified to be
disinformation by an independent fact-checking organization. In
other words, it is envisaged that larger platforms will be able to
rely on their recommendation function to ensure their sites remain
functional and attractive spaces to interact, 190 as well as to

187. See also Kaye Hate Speech Report, supra note 150, para. 50 (“Human evaluation
[ . . . ] must be based on real learning from the communities in which hate speech may be
found, that is, people who can understand the “code” that language sometimes deploys to
hide incitement to violence, evaluate the speaker’s intent, consider the nature of the
speaker and audience and evaluate the environment in which hate speech can lead to
violent acts”).
188 . On the dangers of platforms failing to remove unlawful categories of hate
speech, see, e.g., EQUALITY LABS, FACEBOOK INDIA: TOWARDS THE TIPPING POINT OF VIOLENCE:
CASTE AND RELIGIOUS HATE SPEECH (2019).
189. See Ingram, supra note 139 (in which Alex Stamos argues that, “[i]f you are
allowing for amplification because of money or are financially supporting speech, there is
a much larger [platform] responsibility”). See also Henry Farrell, A Conservative YouTube
Star Just Lost his Income Stream for Homophobic Slurs, WASH. POST, (June 6, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/06/conservative-youtube-starjust-lost-his-income-stream-homophobic-slurs-heres-what-happened-why
[https://perma.cc/Y8M3-B47A].
190. See Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, GEO. L. J. 1353, 1363
(2018) (“Any attempt to protect online speakers from oppressive content moderation
must simultaneously accommodate the content moderation that makes the Internet’s ‘vast
democratic forums’ usable – a delicate and difficult balance”).
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differentiate their respective virtual spaces in ways that reflect
their commercial objectives, culture and feel.191
c. Least Intrusive Restrictive Measure
Third—and very much related to the latter discussion—the
test of necessity also requires consideration of whether the
imposition of a restrictive measure is the least intrusive amongst
those which might achieve their protective function. In the case of
Ballantyne, Davidson and McIntryre v. Canada, for example, the UN
HRC concluded that a prohibition on commercial advertising in
English with the aim of protecting the vulnerable position of the
francophone minority within Canada “may be achieved in other
ways that do not preclude the freedom of expression, in a language
of their choice, of those engaged in such fields as trade.” 192 For
instance, the law could have required that advertising appears in
both French and English.193
In the platform moderation context, when content that
violates a platform’s moderation rules has been identified, the
terms of service and/or community standards generally identify a
range of actions and sanctions that may be taken in response. In
order to align their content moderation policies with the least
intrusive standard, platforms could commit, so far as feasible in
light of their size and circumstances, to diversify the range of
restrictive measures that may be adopted in response to different
types of content. 194 With respect to disinformation, for example,
while its removal may be necessary for certain circumstances, such
as where it is used to incite violence,195 in general, it is possible to
191. SUZOR, supra note 108, at 198-99; ARTICLE 19, supra note 134, at 13. On the
challenge of promoting and protecting diversity with respect to the recommendation
function of online platforms, see generally Natali Helberger, Paddy Leerssen, & Max Van
Drunen, Germany Proposes Europe’s First Diversity Rules for Social Media Platforms, LSE
Media
Policy
Project,
(May
29,
2019),
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/medialse/2019/05/29/germany-proposes-europes-firstdiversity-rules-for-social-media-platforms [https://perma.cc/X9GP-LG3V].
192 . Ballantyne, Davidson, McIntyre v. Canada, Communications 359/1989 and
385/1989, Human Rights Committee, para. 11.4 (May 5, 1993).
193. Id.
194. See generally Land & Hamilton, supra note 79; Kaye Hate Speech Report, supra
note 150, para. 51-52.
195. See, e.g., Lu, Update on Myanmar, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (August 15, 2018)
https://about.fb.com/news/2018/08/update-on-myanmar
[https://perma.cc/J638TML2] (observing how “in Myanmar, false news can be used to incite violence, especially
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envisage a broader spectrum of response options focused on
combatting its spread and influence, including educational
initiatives focused on media literacy, counter-narrative and factchecking collaborations, demonetization, as well as reductions in
its visibility.196
Beyond diversifying response options, larger platforms, in
particular, could also commit to enhancing the ability of users to
control the types of content they view on their platforms.
Enhanced user controls would serve two functions: first, enabling
users to protect themselves from the abusive behavior of other
users online; and second, enabling platforms to manage more
permissive speech environments in the knowledge that their users
are equipped with the means to select the personalized online
experience they desire.
Some platforms have already begun empowering users to set
their own filters and rules for what they see online. Twitter, for
example, enables users to mute or block the accounts of other
users, 197 while Facebook enables users to unfollow other users,
pages and groups in their news feed so as to avoid seeing their
content whilst remaining connected to the entities producing it.198
More recently, Facebook has confirmed plans “to give people more
control of what they see,” initially by enabling users to decide
whether to view less content that is close to the line of violating the
platform’s standards and in the future by providing users with
flexible controls over categories like nudity where cultural norms
and personal preferences vary considerably around the world.199
While these initiatives are welcome, several commentators
have argued that online platforms could go much further in terms
of the level of control they provide to their users. Timothy Garton
Ash and his colleagues, for example, have proposed that Facebook
should establish a range of new controls, including a “news feed
when coupled with ethnic and tensions” and that therefore Facebook would remove
“misinformation that has the potential to contribute to imminent violence or physical
harm”).
196. For an overview of platform policies concerning disinformation, see generally
ARTICLE 19, supra note 32, at 27-29.
197. How to Control Your Twitter Experience, TWITTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/safety-and-security/control-your-twitter-experience
[https://perma.cc/Q2WU-RVWU].
198. Garton Ash, Gorwa, & Metaxa, supra note 2, at 14-15.
199. Zuckerberg, supra note 103.
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analytics feature” that would deconstruct the extent to which
different types of content appear on users’ news feeds, an “adopt a
different point of view” function that would expose users to feeds
with entirely different content to their own, and buttons or sliders
that would enable users to control “whether they wish to see more
content that cross-cuts against their political ideology, whether
they wish to see more news, and whether they wish their News
Feed to be curated at all, or if it should proceed chronologically.”200
In the latter regard, buttons or sliders might also be developed to
enable users to determine their tolerance across a range of content
categories including, for example, nudity or graphic violence.201
An even more ambitious proposal would involve companies
opening up their platforms to allow third parties to develop
“collective lenses” or “feed recipes”—essentially, customized user
interfaces with their own bespoke content visibility and
permissibility policies to which users could subscribe.202 As Mike
Masnick explains, this approach would “push the power and
decision making out to the ends of the network, rather than
keeping it centralized among a small group of very powerful
companies” so as to enable users to choose the online experience
or filtering setup they desire.203 In addition, as Tarleton Gillespie
argues, such an approach would also empower groups of users and
independent organizations to collaborate “to help curate the
platform landscape, in areas and around topics they are most
invested and expert in, at a granularity and precision greater than
the platform could by itself.”204 Interestingly, in December 2019,
Jack Dorsey announced that Twitter would provide funding for a
small independent team, called BlueSky, to develop an open and
200. Garton Ash, Gorwa, & Metaxa, supra note 2, at 16-17. See also The Invisible
Curation of Content: Facebook’s News Feed and our Information Diets, WORLD WIDE WEB
FOUNDATION (April 2018), https://webfoundation.org/research/the-invisible-curation-ofcontent-facebooks-news-feed-and-our-information-diets/
[https://perma.cc/TBY3YDYA].
201. Keller, supra note 49, at 24.
202. GILLESPIE, supra note 3, at 199 (“collective lenses”); see also Columbia Journalism
School, Peter Zenger Lecture with Jonathan Zittrain, YOUTUBE (Nov. 13, 2018) (“feed
recipes”); Masnick, Protocols Not Platforms: A Technological Approach to Free Speech,
KNIGHT
FIRST
AMENDMENT
INSTITUTE
(Aug.
21,
2019),
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/protocols-not-platforms-a-technological-approachto-free-speech [https://perma.cc/H8PP-B8G3] (“a protocols-based system”).
203. See generally Masnick, supra note 133.
204. See generally GILLESPIE, IMPROVING MODERATION (2018).
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decentralized protocol standard for social media—opening up a
potential pathway for this type of initiative to be operationalized
in practice.205
Yet, while enhancing user controls would result in a less topdown approach to platform moderation, it is also important to
recognize the limits and challenges that administering such
controls would entail.206 First, any system of user controls will only
be as effective as the technology on which it relies. Given the
current limits of artificial intelligence, it is likely to be a long time
before platforms are able to establish user controls that enable
users to accurately control their viewing experience with respect
to complex context-dependent categories of content. 207 Second,
platforms will presumably still need to ensure that certain
categories of content are beyond user control, for example, due to
their illegality. 208 With this in mind, difficulties may arise in
selecting which categories of content should be excluded from user
control, defining the boundaries of excluded categories of content,
and policing those lines in practice.209 Finally, it also seems fair to
assume that many users will simply lack the time, energy, or
inclination to take advantage of controls delegated to them, with
the result that the most significant question may become what
default settings apply and, more specifically, whether default
settings should vary according to geographical region.210
205. Mike Masnick, Twitter Makes A Bet On Protocols Over Platforms, TECHDIRT (Dec.
11, 2019), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20191210/21054943552/twitter-makesbet-protocols-over-platforms.shtml [https://perma.cc/S3BA-LSUD]. For a skeptical
perspective, see Michael Kwet, Can Twitter Ever Be Decentralized?, SLATE (December
2019),
https://slate.com/technology/2019/12/jack-dorsey-open-decentralizedtwitter.html [https://perma.cc/U4YM-KX77].
206 . See Langvardt, supra note 190, at 1380-83 (on the relative benefits and
drawbacks of enhanced user controls on platforms); see also Masnick, supra note 202.
207. See Zuckerberg, supra note 103 (“We won’t be able to consider allowing more
content until our artificial intelligence is accurate enough to remove it for everyone else
who doesn’t want to see it”).
208. Id. (“Of course, we’re not going to offer controls to allow any content that could
cause real world harm”).
209. Langvardt, supra note 190, at 1381-82. See, however, Masnick, supra note 202
(“the reality is that these kinds of communities [around things like child exploitation
content or other criminal activities, for example] are already forming – often on the dark
web – and the way they are dealt with today is mostly via law enforcement […] There is
little reason to think that in a protocol-focused world, this problem would be all that
different than what currently exists”).
210. Mark Zuckerberg, Building Global Community, FACEBOOK (Feb. 16, 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/building-global-
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d. Protective Function of Restrictive Measure
Finally, the test of necessity also entails assessing whether the
restrictive measures taken in response to particular forms of
expression actually fulfill their protective function. Applied to the
content moderation context, platforms could commit to assessing
whether a particular response measure has any unintended
negative consequences that may outweigh its protective benefits
through an evidence-based approach. 211 According to Daphne
Keller, for example, some of the policies adopted by online
platforms to counter violent extremism “may cultivate precisely
the attitudes and animosities that counter-radicalization efforts
are supposed to prevent.” 212 As Keller explains, “if suppressing
propaganda from real terrorists comes at the cost of high overremoval rates for innocent Arabic-language posts or speech about
Islam generally, the trade-off may be not only disrespectful and
unfair but dangerous.” 213 Where a response measure is found to
restrict the freedom of expression of users without effectively
furthering a legitimate purpose, platforms should commit to
revising their policies accordingly.
Ultimately, the application of the test of necessity is one of the
most challenging aspects of operationalizing a human rights-based
approach to content moderation—and one which would benefit
significantly from an independent multistakeholder mechanism to
assist platforms in determining what restrictions are necessary in
light of their diverse functions and contexts of operation. Yet, even
in the trickiest cases, the test of necessity remains valuable to the
extent that it requires platforms to openly explain and justify the
trade-offs they inevitably have to make in a manner that surfaces
the different rights and interests involved.
C.

The Process of Content Moderation

In addition to aligning the substance of their content
moderation rules with international human rights law, adherence
community/10154544292806634/ [https://perma.cc/32EY-9E6B] (suggesting that “the
default will be whatever the majority of people in your region selected, like a
referendum”).
211. Aswad, supra note 142, at 51-52.
212. Keller, supra note 49, at 22.
213. Id. at 24.
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to a human rights-based approach also requires online platforms
to address the adverse human rights impacts of their moderation
processes. Important processes in this context include the revision
of terms of service and community standards, the management of
systems of community and algorithmic flagging, the governance of
human and algorithmic decision-making, the transparency of usergenerated and advertising content, and the response of platforms
to regulatory pressures.214
In order to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how
they address the adverse human rights impacts of their
moderation processes, online platforms should establish a policy
commitment to meet their responsibility to respect and carry out
ongoing human rights due diligence.215 The due diligence process
should be initiated as early as possible in the development of new
platform activities or relationships and be undertaken at regular
intervals throughout the life of an activity or relationship. 216 As
part of the process, platforms should put in place “policies and
processes through which they can both know and show that they
respect human rights in practice.”217
In practice, there are three core stages to the process of
human rights due diligence:218 first, identifying and assessing any
actual or potential adverse human rights impacts with which a
platform may be involved either through their own activities or as
a result of their business relationships;219 second, taking effective
action to prevent and mitigate adverse human rights impacts and
tracking those responses to ensure they are being implemented
optimally; 220 and finally, transparently communicating sufficient
information externally about the platform’s efforts to identify,
prevent and mitigate adverse human rights impacts so that the
adequacy of any response measures may be evaluated. 221 To
elaborate on the challenges of applying these standards in the
platform moderation context, this section examines four forms of
transparency and oversight—rule-making, decision-making,
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See SUZOR, supra note 108, at 201-20.
UNGP, Principles 16-17 and Commentary.
Id. Principles 17-18 and Commentary.
Id. Principle 21 and Commentary.
See Toronto Declaration, supra note 127, para. 44.
UNGP, Principles 17-18 and Commentary.
Id. Principles 19-20 and Commentary.
Id. Principle 21 and Commentary.
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content and advertising, and regulatory compliance—that
platforms should address as part of their human right due
diligence processes in practice.
1. Rule-making
First, platforms should address their rule-making
transparency and oversight.222 Online platforms have often been
criticized for failing to adequately consult with their users, civil
society groups, or the general public concerning the development
and revision of their moderation rules. According to Rebecca
MacKinnon, for example, Facebook adheres to “a Hobbesian
approach to governance in which people agree to relinquish a
certain amount of freedom to a benevolent sovereign who in turn
provides security and other services.” 223 This approach is in
tension with a human rights-based approach to content
moderation. According to Principle 18 of the UNGP, human rights
due diligence conducted by business enterprises should draw on
“internal and/or independent external human rights expertise”
and involve “meaningful consultation with potentially affected
groups and other relevant stakeholders, as appropriate to the size
of the business enterprise and the nature and context of the
operation.” 224
In recent years, online platforms have taken steps to offer
more opportunities for participation and feedback concerning
their moderation rules. Facebook, for example, has stated that
when its content policy team meet every few weeks to discuss
potential changes to its moderation policies, they regularly invite
outside experts and have begun to make the meeting minutes
publicly available. 225 Facebook also launched a series of public
events around the world entitled Facebook Forums: Community
Standards to obtain public feedback on its policies directly.226 In
addition, Facebook has voluntarily submitted to three audits—a
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Kaye, supra note 73, at 121 (“rulemaking transparency”).
MACKINNON ET AL., supra note 47, at 408.
UNGP, Principle 18 and Commentary.
Zuckerberg, supra note 103.
Monika Bickert, Publishing Our Internal Enforcement Guidelines and Expanding
Our
Appeals
Process,
FACEBOOK
(Apr.
24,
2018),
https://about.fb.com/news/2018/04/comprehensive-community-standards/
[https://perma.cc/WU8Y-PRAF].
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civil rights review of its internal operations, an investigation into
whether the platform is biased against conservatives, and a human
rights impact assessment of the company’s presence in
Myanmar—and established an independent election research
commission to identify research topics and select independent
researchers to examine them using Facebook data.227
While these developments have resulted in important
recommendations and commitments concerning the platform’s
moderation rules and policies, 228 Facebook and other major
platforms could go much further in ensuring more structured
multistakeholder participation in the development and revision of
their content moderation rules. In recent years, a number of
proposals have been put forward by scholars and civil society
groups that platforms could consider for this purpose. For
example, platforms could adopt “notice-and-comment” procedures
to obtain public feedback on proposed changes to their moderation
policies,229 appoint outside experts as “amici curiae” or in the form
of an advisory panel to inform their policy decisions, 230 and/or
support the creation of independent multistakeholder bodies to
help ensure the compatibility of platform moderation policies with
international human rights law. 231 While these proposals are
varied—and would be subject to feasibility constraints according
to the size and circumstances of a platform—they are premised on
a shared belief that platforms would benefit from a more
structured and sustainable approach to stakeholder engagement
concerning their rule-making processes.

227. Garton Ash, Gorwa, & Metaxa, supra note 2, at 18-19; see also Mark Zuckerberg,
Preparing
for
Elections,
FACEBOOK
(Sep.
13,
2008).
https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/preparing-forelections/10156300047606634/ [https://perma.cc/3XAN-S4TF].
228. See, e.g., Facebook’s Civil Rights Audit – Progress Report, 9-13 (June 30, 2019),
https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/civilrightaudit_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4UPA-UNKA] (outlining recommendations to improve Facebook’s
white nationalism, hate speech and harassment policies).
229. Bloch-Wehba, Global Platform Governance: Private Power in the Shadow of the
State, 72 SMU L. REV. 27, 76 (2019).
230. Id.; Gillespie, supra note 18, at 214; Garton Ash, Gorwa, & Metaxa, supra note 2,
at 19-20.
231. See, e.g., Gillespie, supra note 18, at 214 (Public Ombudsman); ARTICLE 19, supra
note 134 (Social Media Councils); GLOBAL PARTNERS DIGITAL, supra note 148, at 26-28
(Independent Online Platform Standards Oversight Body).
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2. Decision-making
Beyond rule-making, platforms should also address their
systems of transparency and oversight concerning their human
and algorithmic decision-making processes. In practice, this form
of transparency and oversight has both quantitative and
qualitative dimensions. Quantitative transparency and oversight
refer to the statistical information disclosed by online platforms
concerning their content moderation systems. Applying a human
rights-based approach, platforms should disclose statistical
information concerning the different categories of content removal
requests they receive, the different types of actors that submit such
requests, and the range of measures adopted in response.
Moreover, to the extent feasible, platforms could also develop
accuracy metrics, which enable platforms to calculate and publish
error rates for human reviewers and algorithmic detection for
different categories of violation,232 as well as a range of metrics to
evaluate the effectiveness of platform decision-making—for
example, a metric that measures the virality of content found to
violate moderation rules prior to its removal.233
Although online platforms have generally made incremental
progress in the quality of their transparency reports, greater care
and attention could be directed towards how content moderation
statistics are disaggregated. In particular, platforms could
distinguish between requests received through lawful channels
such as court-orders, demands received from governments
pursuant to a platform’s terms of service, requests received from
Internet referral units, requests received pursuant to voluntary
arrangements such as the EU Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal
Hate Speech Online, complaints submitted by private users, and
proactive actions taken by platforms themselves including
different forms of algorithmic decision-making. 234 To this end,
platforms could draw guidance from the Santa Clara Principles on
Transparency and Accountability in Content Moderation,235 which
set out the minimum level of detail that platforms should be
232. Report of the Facebook Data Transparency Advisory Group, April 2019
[hereinafter Facebook DTAG Report] at 16.
233. Id. at 18-28.
234. Kaye Content Moderation Report, supra note 10, at 16-17.
235 . The Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and Accountability in Content
Moderation (2018) [hereinafter Santa Clara Principles].
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expected to disclose concerning their content moderation
practices.236
Quantitative insights by themselves, however, are an
inadequate means for assessing platform decision-making
systems—for the simple reason that, without any form of
independent verification, it is impossible to discern whether
aggregate statistics accurately reflect the definitions and standards
elaborated in a platform’s moderation rules. As Evelyn Douek has
put it, “[w]ithout verification or intelligibility, aggregate reports
become a form of transparency theater, deployed to ward off calls
for greater accountability.”237 With this in mind, applying a human
rights-based approach, platforms should also establish qualitative
forms of transparency and oversight, ideally through independent
forms of verification and auditing that aim to identify and assess
the actual and potential adverse human rights impacts of their
systems of community and algorithmic flagging of potentially
disallowed content, the different tiers of human and algorithmic
review that such content is subjected to, and any algorithms relied
upon to personalize user experience—making sure to integrate
findings from their impact assessments through appropriate
action, track the effectiveness of such measures, and communicate
how they address adverse human rights impacts externally. In
practice, appropriate action will depend on the adverse human
rights impacts identified.
In terms of community flagging, for example, concerns have
been raised about the practice of minority and vulnerable groups
being targeted by coordinated mass reporting sprees of their
accounts by groups that are politically or ideologically opposed to
them. Appropriate action to guard against this practice could
include treating reporting sprees as abusive behavior that is
prohibited in platform moderation rules and placing limits on how
many reports any single account can make in a day.238
With respect to human review, concerns have been raised
about inadequacies in the number and cultural competency of
moderators to accurately and effectively remove content that
236. See generally Facebook DTAG Report, supra note 232.
237. Douek, supra note 135, at 12.
238. Dia Kayyali, Facebook’s Name Policy Strikes Again, This Time at Native Americans,
EFF DEEPLINKS BLOG (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/02/facebooksname-policy-strikes-again-time-native-americans [https://perma.cc/3TZQ-FFVR].
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violates platform moderation rules in different local contexts,
including countries in the midst of turmoil or conflict, such as
Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Libya, and the Philippines. 239 Appropriate
action to address these concerns could include platforms
committing to ensure adequate cultural and linguistic expertise
across all markets in which they operate,240 as well as establishing
structured forms of engagement with local stakeholders, including
early warning and emergency escalation functions, to enhance the
ability of platforms to prevent their sites being instrumentalized
for the promotion of violence. 241 Beyond the accuracy and
effectiveness of human review, concerns have also been raised
about the damaging work conditions and inadequate labor
protections afforded to human reviewers, a particularly serious
concern in light of the severe psychological toll that content
moderation entails. 242 Appropriate action to address such
concerns could include disclosing more information concerning
the number, diversity, location, working conditions, support, and
training put in place for human moderators, as well as committing
to establish adequate labor protections in accordance with
international human rights standards.243
Finally, in terms of algorithmic decision-making, a range of
concerns have arisen over the opacity of algorithms, including the
potential for algorithmic biases that adversely impact the human
rights of different groups of users. Appropriate action in response
to these concerns could take various forms. Recognizing the
current limits of algorithmic decision-making, platforms could
commit to ensuring that there will always be meaningful human
involvement in their algorithmic decision-making processes and
adequate safeguards in place in case an algorithm acts
unpredictably.244 Facebook, for example, has recently committed
239. Garton Ash, Gorwa, & Metaxa, supra note 2, at 11.
240. Kaye Content Moderation Report, supra note 10, at 18.
241. See, e.g., Ingram, supra note 178 (describing a new Facebook tool that allows
approved civil society groups to flag problematic material in a way that is seen more
quickly by the company than if a regular user had reported the material).
242. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 89.
243. Kaye Content Moderation Report, supra note 10, at 18.
244. GLOBAL PARTNERS DIGITAL, supra note 148, at 22; McGregor, Murray & Ng, supra
note 90, at 341-42. See also Spandana Singh, Everything in Moderation: An Analysis of How
Internet Platforms Are Using Artificial Intelligence to Moderate User-Generated Content,
NEW AMERICA (July 22, 2019), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/reports/everythingmoderation-analysis-how-internet-platforms-are-using-artificial-intelligence-moderate-
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to removing thousands of targeting terms for advertisers offering
housing, employment, or credit opportunities as part of a
settlement of multiple discrimination lawsuits. 245 While a
promising development, similar changes may be required for other
categories of online advertising—for example, political advertising
in light of evidence that voter suppression and intimidation tactics
have been deployed on Facebook.246
Steps could also be taken to improve algorithmic
transparency by explaining when algorithms are used, how they
work, and their consequences for users in different contexts
including the key criteria that underpin particular decisions.247 In
practice, however, enhancing algorithmic transparency in the
platform moderation context raises a number of challenges.
Meaningful transparency is complicated by the fact that algorithms
are frequently altered—Google, for example, updates its
algorithms hundreds of times per year—and often rely on machine
learning techniques, which can lead to a divergence between what
programmers believe an algorithm does and how it actually
behaves. 248 There is also a risk that making algorithms more
transparent will expose platforms to manipulation and gaming.249
And even if a human moderator is “in the loop” of an algorithmic
decision-making process, the risk remains that the moderator may
unquestioningly or subconsciously defer to the algorithmic
decision due to perceptions of technological neutrality and
accuracy—often referred to as “automation bias.”250

user-generated-content/ [https://perma.cc/7J2L-YNHF] (arguing that platforms should
invest greater efforts in hiring developers who are non-Western and non-English speakers
to help reduce data and creator biases).
245. See generally Facebook’s Civil Rights Audit – Progress Report, (June 30, 2019),
at 15-17. Cf. Ava Kofman & Ariana Tobin, Facebook Ads Can Still Discriminate Against
Women and Older Workers, Despite a Civil Rights Settlement, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-ads-can-still-discriminate-againstwomen-and-older-workers-despite-a-civil-rights-settlement
[https://perma.cc/QAJ5GTPS].
246 . Siva Vaidhyanathan, Facebook is Ripe for Exploitation – Again – in 2020,
GUARDIAN
(July
9,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/09/facebook-is-ripe-forexploitation-again-in-2020 [https://perma.cc/MF9Y-BXUW].
247. Kaye AI Report, supra note 84, at 18.
248. CoE Report, supra note 84, at 38.
249. Langvardt, supra note 190, at 1384.
250. McGregor, Murray, & Ng, supra note 90, at 338-41.
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Some commentators have also cautioned that focusing
narrowly on individual rights to algorithmic transparency risks
creating a “transparency fallacy” since “individuals are mostly too
time-poor, resource-poor, and lacking in the necessary expertise to
meaningfully make use of these individual rights.”251 Edwards and
Veale, for example, argue that “creating better systems, with less
opacity, clearer audit trails, well and holistically trained designers,
and input from concerned publics seems eminently more
appealing than grimly pursuing against the odds a “meaningful”
version of the interior of a black box.”252 Following this approach,
platforms should devote more time and attention to establishing
systems of internal and external review concerning how their
algorithms are developed and deployed in decision-making
processes.253
Proposals to expose algorithms to external audits are also
likely to meet with resistance because platforms generally regard
their underlying software code as protected proprietary
technology. 254 However, these concerns are not insurmountable.
Joshua Kroll, for example, has discussed the possibility of
“accountability by design,” which relies on techniques from
computer science “to create systems with properties that can be
checked by regulators or the public without revealing the
underlying code and data.”255 Other options include examining the
outcomes of algorithmic decision-making to identify biases or
using counterfactual explanations to reveal how algorithms arrive
at their decisions. 256 Ultimately, regardless of the precise
modalities for improving the transparency and oversight of human
and algorithmic processes, an important value of the human rightsbased approach is the expectation it generates for platforms to
adopt a cyclical approach to accountability whereby ongoing due
251. Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? What a ‘Right to an
Explanation’ is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18,
67 (2017).
252. Id. at 82.
253. Kaye AI Report, supra note 84, at 19-20; Douek, supra note 135, at 12.
254. CoE Report, supra note 84, at 38.
255 . Joshua A. Kroll, Accountable Algorithms (A Provocation), LSE MEDIA POLICY
PROJECT (Feb.10, 2016), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/medialse/2016/02/10/accountablealgorithms-a-provocation/ [https://perma.cc/XH86-7CD6].
256. See generally Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt, & Chris Russell, Counterfactual
Explanations without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR, 31 HARV.
J. OF L. & TECH. 841 (2018).
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diligence efforts are enhanced by lessons learned from previous
results across the entire human and algorithmic decision-making
life cycle.257
3. Content and Advertising
The third form of transparency and oversight that platforms
should address concerns the data disclosed to users about the
content and advertising they view and share. Although content and
advertising transparency on platforms has traditionally been very
limited, improvements have been made in recent years. 258
Facebook, for example, enables users to access all advertisements
that a page is running across Facebook, Instagram, and Messenger,
to identify any recent name changes and the date a page was
created, and to obtain some insight into the categories used by
advertisers to micro-target users through their “Why am I seeing
this?” button. In addition, in the US, Facebook requires all political
and issue advertisements to make clear who paid for them, to be
stored for up to 7 years in a public archive which anyone can access
and search to identify how much was spent on an individual
advertisement and the audience it reached, and also requires
anyone running such ads to verify their identity and location.259
While these types of measures are a step in the right direction,
they are still relatively modest. Tarleton Gillespie, for example, has
challenged online platforms to provide more data about links that
are shared by users, as well as more radical transparency
concerning all types of advertising. With respect to links shared by
users, Gillespie proposes a dashboard that would appear when
hovering over a link, which would report “how long the source of
that link has been online, a graph of how much and how quickly
that headline is being forwarded, the headlines before and after
this one from the same source, and how often other articles from
that source have been disputed by fact checkers,” as well as details
257. McGregor, Murray, & Ng, supra note 90, at 327-29.
258. But see Jeremy B. Merrill & Ariana Tobin, Facebook Moves to Block Ad
Transparency
Tools
–
Including
Ours,
PROPUBLICA,
(Jan.
28,
2019),
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-blocks-ad-transparency-tools
[https://perma.cc/F62D-N77P].
259. Zuckerberg, supra note 227. For a critical discussion of platform ad archives, see
generally Leerssen et al., Platform Ad Archives: Promises and Pitfalls,8 INTERNET POL’Y REV.
(2019).
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about the person who posted the link, including how long they
have been on the platform, the last five articles they shared,
whether they have previously been reprimanded by the platform
and whether the user read the article before forwarding it. 260
Gillespie also argues that platforms could reveal significantly more
data about advertisements, including the days on which an
advertisement was delivered to any users, the targeting criteria,
the number of users the advertisement was delivered to directly
and reach indirectly, how much the advertiser paid for its
circulation, and a link back to the advertiser’s profile page, all of
which could be stored in a public and searchable archive.261 Since
online platforms extract significant economic value from the data
shared by and inferred from the behavior of their users, radical
transparency is not only reasonable in this context but also a tool
that may assist civil society groups, journalists, and regulators to
monitor and hold platforms and advertisers to account.
4. Regulatory Compliance
A final form of transparency and oversight concerns how
online platforms respond to both mandatory regulatory measures
and informal regulatory pressures that may have adverse human
rights impacts on their users. According to Principle 23 of the
UNGP, while business enterprises should comply with all
applicable laws wherever they operate, they should also “seek
ways to honor the principles of internationally recognized human
rights when faced with conflicting requirements.”262 In particular,
if the domestic context renders it impossible for companies to fully
satisfy their corporate responsibility, “business enterprises are
expected to respect the principles of internationally recognized
human rights to the greatest extent possible in the circumstances,
and to be able to demonstrate their efforts in this regard.”263
Examples of the types of measures that platforms may adopt
in this context have been elaborated by the Global Network
Initiative (“GNI”). The GNI is a multistakeholder alliance of
companies, civil society groups and academic institutions whose
260.
261.
262.
263.

Gillespie, supra note 204, iv.
Id. vii-viii.
UNGP, Principle 23.
Id. Principle 23 and Commentary.
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aim is to “protect and advance freedom of expression and privacy
in the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) industry
globally.” 264 Since its inception, the GNI has been subject to
significant criticism, with concerns raised over its inadequate
corporate membership, insufficiently independent assessment
process, and lack of a remedial mechanism.265 Without diminishing
the force of these concerns, the documents that underpin the GNI’s
work nonetheless provide useful guidance regarding how online
platforms should respond when confronted by State demands to
undermine the freedom of expression rights of their users.
According to the GNI’s Principles on Freedom of Expression and
Privacy, when confronted by national laws, regulations or policies
that do not conform to international standards, “companies should
avoid, minimize, or otherwise address the adverse impact of
government demands, laws, or regulations, and seek ways to honor
the principles of internationally recognized human rights to the
greatest extent possible.”266 To this end, the GNI’s Implementation
Guidelines elaborate a number of tools that participating
companies are required to rely upon in practice.267 In particular,
participating companies agree to encourage governments to be
specific, transparent and consistent in demands, laws, and
regulations that impact freedom of expression, as well as engage
proactively with governments to reach a shared understanding of
how government restrictions can be applied consistently with
international human rights law. Participating companies also
agree to require governments to follow established domestic legal
processes when seeking to restrict freedom of expression, and to
request clear written communications from the government that
explain the legal basis for such restrictions. Finally, participating
companies are also required to narrowly interpret government
264. The Global Network Initiative, Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy
[hereinafter “GNI Principles”], at 1.
265. Jørgensen, supra note 6, at 262-63; LAIDLAW, supra note 4, at 104-10.
266. GNI Principles, supra note 264, at 2.
267. The Global Network Initiative, Implementation Guidelines for the Principles on
Freedom of Expression and Privacy, at 8-10. See also Hilary Hurd, How Facebook Can Use
International Law in Content Moderation, LAWFARE (Oct. 30, 2019),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-facebook-can-use-international-law-contentmoderation [https://perma.cc/GJL4-G6M6] (proposing that Facebook should require
States to submit formal explanations of why and how their take-down requests comply
with the tripartite test set out in Article 19(3) ICCPR).
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restrictions and demands so as to minimize the negative effect on
freedom of expression and, where appropriate, to challenge any
restrictions or demands that appear overbroad within domestic
courts.
Beyond adopting measures that seek to reduce the impact of
overly-intrusive State requests and regulations, platforms should
also address the extent to which they publicly disclose the different
pressures exerted by States over their moderation practices. For
instance, platforms could consult or hire ombudspersons to assess
State content removal requests and identify requests that would
result in the removal of content that is significant for public
debate.268 By providing meaningful transparency, online platforms
may be able to help illuminate and generate public conversation
about the extent to which particular forms of regulatory pressure
may be undermining the freedom of expression rights of their
users. 269
D.

The Procedure and Remediation of Content Moderation

However well-articulated and enforced a platform’s
moderation processes may be, mistakes will inevitably occur that
generate adverse effects for the freedom of expression of platform
users. Addressing this situation, Principle 22 of the UNGP confirms
that companies “should provide for or cooperate in their
remediation through legitimate processes.” 270 More specifically,
Principle 29 of the UNGP provides that business enterprises
“should establish or participate in effective operational-level
grievance mechanisms for individuals and communities who may
be adversely impacted.”271
Grievance mechanisms can take many forms, but are
generally intended to perform two important functions:272 first, to
support the identification of adverse human rights impacts in
business operations; and second, to enable grievances to be
addressed and adverse impacts remediated early and directly by
business enterprises. Importantly, Principle 31 elaborates a set of
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Citron, supra note 54, at 1067-69.
Id.
UNGP, Principle 22.
Id. Principle 29.
Id. Principle 29 and Commentary.
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effectiveness criteria that grievance mechanisms should reflect,
namely that they should be legitimate, accessible, predictable,
equitable, transparent, rights-compatible, a source of continuous
learning, and based on engagement and dialogue.273
Applying these principles and criteria to the specific context
of content moderation, there are three areas that online platforms
should address to improve the effectiveness of their procedural
and remedial processes. 274 The first area concerns due process.
Adherence to a human rights-based approach to content
moderation requires platforms to afford due process to affected
users—including adequate notice and avenues for appeal. Yet, as
Evelyn Douek has recently observed, “due process does not mean
perfect process” and “what ‘due process’ means needs to be
determined contextually.”275 The challenge, as Douek puts it, is to
identify “what the ‘due’ in ‘due process’ means in the context of the
scale of the online platforms.”276 A useful point of departure for this
conversation is offered by the Santa Clara Principles.
In terms of notice, the Santa Clara Principles suggest that
“companies should provide notice to each user whose content is
taken down or account is suspended about the reason for the
removal or suspension.”277 At a minimum, notices should contain,
in a language understandable to the user, information sufficient to
allow the identification of the removed content, the specific
provision of a platform’s moderation policies that has been
violated, how the content was detected and removed, and an
explanation of the process by which the user can appeal the
decision as well as an indicative time frame and what remedies
may be available if successful. 278 In terms of appeals, the Santa
Clara Principles suggest that “[c]ompanies should provide a
meaningful opportunity for timely appeal of any content removal
or account suspension.” 279 At a minimum, meaningful appeal
means human review by a person or panel of persons not involved
in the initial decision, an opportunity to present additional
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id. Principle 31.
SUZOR, supra note 108, at 220-25 (referring to “scalable due process”).
Douek, supra note 135, at 8 & 10 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 9.
Santa Clara Principles, supra note 235.
Id.
Id.
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information, and notification of the results of the appeal, including
a statement of the reasoning to enable the user to understand the
decision. 280 In addition, given the importance of context for
assessing content, it would also be beneficial for reviewers to be
granted access to more contextual information about the pieces of
content that they review on appeal.281 Moreover, particular care
should be taken to ensure that any appeals process is clear and
easy to use for the average user and not susceptible to being gamed
or abused. The appeals mechanism administered by Amazon, for
example, has recently been criticized for becoming “the ultimate
weapon in the constant warfare of Marketplace,” its rules and
processes “so confounding that it’s given rise to an entire industry
of consultants.”282
While the Santa Clara Principles offer a useful starting point,
the challenge remains in defining what adequate due process
means in the specific context of different types of platforms.
According to Douek, for example, platforms should strive for a
“systematic understanding of due process” that contextually
calibrates the level of process that is afforded to affected users in
practice, for instance “by more explicitly differentiating between
the different categories of speech that content moderation
implicates, accounting for the difficulty of making a correct
decision in each category, the public importance of the underlying
speech, and how people experience different kinds of decisions.”283
To this end, some form of oversight mechanism could be useful in
providing platforms with “a forum for error explanation and more
deliberate choices between trade-offs involved in any system
design.”284
To date, there are indications that oversight mechanisms may
emerge at both the cross-platform and individual platform levels.
At the cross-platform level, for example, civil society group Article
19 has proposed the establishment of a multistakeholder
accountability mechanism for platform moderation in the form of
280. Id.
281. Garton Ash, Gorwa, & Metaxa, supra note 2, at 13.
282. Josh Dzieza, Prime and Punishment, VERGE (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/19/18140799/amazon-marketplace-scams-sellercourt-appeal-reinstatement [https://perma.cc/42VB-P574].
283. Douek, supra note 135, at 10.
284. Id.
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multistakeholder Social Media Councils. 285 At the individual
platform level, Facebook recently concluded a consultation
concerning the establishment of a new Oversight Board for
Content Decisions aimed at providing “a new way for people to
appeal content decisions.”286 The creation of each of these bodies
raises a host of issues centered on institutional design, including
questions concerning whether such bodies will be global, regional
or national, the breadth of their jurisdiction and powers, and the
extent of their independence and authority. Nonetheless, each has
the potential to serve as a useful mechanism to help platforms
navigate the complex terrain of translating international human
rights standards to the platform moderation context—whether
through reviewing the compatibility of emblematic individual
cases with international human rights law and/or providing
general guidance on the compliance of platform processes and
procedures with international human rights standards.287
In addition to due process, a second area for platforms to
address is the question of remedies. In terms of remedies for
wrongful removal of content or suspension/termination of user
accounts, David Kaye has suggested that online platforms “should
institute robust remediation programmes, which may range from
reinstatement and acknowledgement to settlements related to
reputational or other harms.”288 In a typical case, reinstatement of
the content or the account may be the most effective remedy. Other
possible remedies such as a public apology, guarantees of nonrepetition, or compensation may also be appropriate depending on

285. See generally ARTICLE 19, supra note 134.
286. Facebook Newsroom, Global Feedback and Input on the Facebook Oversight
Board for Content Decisions (June 27, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/06/globalfeedback-on-oversight-board [https://perma.cc/99YJ-GZKG]. See also Evelyn Douek,
Facebook’s “Oversight Board:” Move Fast with Stable Infrastructure and Humility, 21 N.C. J.
L. & TECH. 1, 2-3 (2019).
287. See, e.g., ARTICLE 19, supra note 134, at 13 (acknowledging that any Social Media
Council mechanism will need to afford platforms a “margin of appreciation” to allow the
application of international human rights standards in specific national contexts and
enable differentiation between different companies and their respective products);
Facebook Newsroom, supra note 286 (noting that a general theme to emerge from
Facebook’s consultation was that the Oversight Board “will need a strong foundation for
its decision-making, a set of higher-order principles – informed by free expression and
international human rights law – that it can refer to when prioritizing values like safety and
voice, privacy and equality”) (emphasis added).
288. Kaye Content Moderation Report, supra note 10, at 18.
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the circumstances. 289 In terms of sanctions for violating content
moderation rules, Kaye also suggests that platforms should have
“graduated responses according to the severity of the violation or
the recidivism of the user.” 290 Sanctions might include, for
example, de-amplification, de-monetization, requiring suspended
users to issue an apology in order to be reinstated, or
compensation. 291 A particular challenge in this regard—and one
which would benefit from further multistakeholder reflection—is
the question of how to establish a process for providing an effective
remedy to victims who suffer physical, psychological or
reputational harm as a result of failures by platforms to remove
particular types of content, without at the same time incentivizing
online platforms to over-censor the content of their users.
Finally, platforms should also address remediation
transparency and stakeholder engagement. In both the design and
implementation of their remediation processes, online platforms
should engage relevant stakeholders, including through
quantitative transparency concerning the frequency, patterns and
reasons for appeals, so that they are well-equipped to identify
policies and processes in need of reform. 292 Accompanying
quantitative transparency, David Kaye has also suggested that
platforms should improve their qualitative “decisional
transparency” by developing a public, accessible and easily
searchable jurisprudence of “platform law.” 293 And ultimately,
platforms should commit to address and revise problematic
aspects of their remediation processes identified by stakeholders
in a timely manner.
IV. CONCLUSION
The governance of speech in the digital age depends to a
significant degree on the policies and processes of online
platforms. Ensuring that these platforms govern in the public
interest has emerged as one of the most pressing challenges for
freedom of expression in the twenty-first century. In light of the
289. GLOBAL PARTNERS DIGITAL, supra note 148, at 24.
290. Kaye Hate Speech Report, supra note 150, para. 54-55.
291. Id.
292. GLOBAL PARTNERS DIGITAL, supra note 148, at 24.
293. Kaye Content Moderation Report, supra note 10, at 19. See also Garton Ash,
Gorwa, & Metaxa, supra note 2, at 12.
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wide range of problems that have been identified with existing
platform moderation practices, the Article has explored the extent
to which a human rights-based approach may help to alleviate such
concerns. In particular, the Article has demonstrated how the
adoption of a human rights-based approach would mark a
significant shift towards a more structured and principled
approach to content moderation by providing platforms with a
framework and the conceptual tools to holistically assess and
address the adverse human rights impacts of their moderation
rules, processes and procedures. At the same time, the Article has
been careful not to present the human rights-based approach as a
panacea—revealing the various challenges and choices that online
platforms are likely to confront in operationalizing such an
approach in practice.
The implementation of a human rights-based approach to
content moderation is not simple, raising complex questions
concerning how to translate general human rights standards into
particular rules, processes, and procedures tailored to the platform
moderation context. This task is complicated by the diversity of
services and spaces that online platforms offer and the wide range
of societies in which they operate. Given this complexity, the risk
inevitably arises that online platforms may try to co-opt the
vocabulary of human rights to legitimize minor reforms at the
expense of undertaking more structural or systemic changes to
their moderation processes. Moreover, even if a human rightsbased approach were to be effectively implemented by online
platforms, it is important to remember that such an approach is not
a silver bullet for alleviating all concerns that have been raised
concerning platform moderation practices. Given the complexity of
content moderation, there will always be trade-offs that are
disagreeable to some users, while a degree of human or
algorithmic error is unavoidable.294
The power and influence of online platforms also suggest that
they should not be considered the exclusive province of any single
regulatory paradigm. Rather, multiple paradigms will be needed to
address different dimensions of online platforms, including, for
example, data protection law, electoral and advertising regulation,

294. See also GODWIN, supra note 73, at 175-78.
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and antitrust and competition law. 295 Furthermore, while the
Article has focused on the responsibilities of the companies that
manage online platforms, it is important to emphasize that the
protection of freedom of expression online necessarily entails
addressing the responsibilities of the far broader range of actors
that participate in the digital public sphere—including, for
example, governments, political parties, data brokers, mass media
organizations, and advertisers.
Finally, it should also be that the online information
ecosystem is more diverse than the online platforms discussed in
the Article, encompassing a broader range of technologies, the
unique characteristics of which will require bespoke policy
responses. For example, the architecture of messaging services
such as WhatsApp—where activity consists of encrypted personal
conversations and groups involving up to 256 people—makes it
much harder to stem the flow of disinformation compared to the
virtual spaces administered by online platforms.296 Going forward,
more attention will need to be directed towards the broader array
of services and technologies relied upon for online communication
around the world.

295. See also European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘EPDS Opinion on Online
Manipulation and Personal Data’, Opinion 2/2018, 19 Mar. 2018 at 13ff.
296 . Cristina Tardágulia, Fabrício Benevenuto, & Pablo Ortellado, Fake News Is
Poisoning Brazilian Politics. WhatsApp Can Stop It, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/opinion/brazil-election-fake-newswhatsapp.html [https://perma.cc/2XDC-WK8Z].

